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INTRODUCTION 
 
To begin with, the use of human shields is strictly prohibited under international law. However, 
there is no explicit definition of human shields in international law. Essentially, human 
shielding implies the taking part in hostilities by persons, who are not supposed to be present 
on the battlefield at all. In its turn, by this participation it means the shielding military objectives 
with human bodies in order to prevent possible attack. The absence of definition is not the only 
one peculiarity of human shields laying in the very basics of the concept. It should be mentioned 
that the concept is not approached by the only one branch of international law, and it is quite 
complex and confusing concept. As it was already mentioned, there is no definition of human 
shields and human shielding can easily be mistaken with treachery, for example. Especially 
when the combatants behave treacherous by pretending civilians.  
 
Another significant peculiarity of the human shields lies in the character of the shields. The key 
is that human shields can be formed voluntarily or involuntarily. Therefore, there are voluntary 
human shields and involuntary human shields. In should be understood that voluntary human 
shielding supposes that the members of human shields are not forced by party to the conflict to 
take part in hostilities. If voluntary human shields put their life in danger because of their desire, 
the involuntary human shields do not act on the base of personal will. Members of involuntary 
human shields are forced by party to the conflict to take part in hostilities. As for the 
international law approach to the issue of voluntariness, it does not explicitly distinguish 
voluntary and involuntary human shields, however. 
 
Nevertheless, in/voluntariness does not have inconsiderable impact on the determination 
whether the human shield takes direct or indirect participation in hostilities. The in/direct 
participation in hostilities as a feature is another peculiarity of human shields. In general, direct 
participation in hostilities suggests committing a direct harm to the enemy on the battlefield. It 
is believed that involuntary human shielding is an example of indirect participation in hostilities 
because of the reason the members of such shield do not have aspiration to take part in hostilities 
and to cause damage. In contrast, the voluntary human shields are believed to directly 
participate in hostilities. As a consequence, there is a dilemma – how the in/voluntariness and 
in/direct participation in hostilities influence the status and protection of in/voluntary human 
shields. 
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The determination of status of human shields is a difficult question in international law. The 
status is meant to show how the person should be treated according to the law. Dilemma of 
status of human shields lies in the determination of the status. Since there are peculiarities of 
willingness, participation in hostilities and type of participation, there is an issue whether the 
status depends on them. The Targeted Killing case,1 for example, showed that the question of 
intent of the people, who took part in hostilities in the role of human shields, is central to the 
determination of their actual role during hostilities. The actual presence of human shields on 
the battlefield can possibly confuse the belligerent. This confusion is about the absence of 
understanding who the members of the shield are – combatants, the levee en masse, persons 
accompanying the armed forces, hors de combat, or innocent civilians, for example. 
 
As for the protection of human shields, it is another sharp question. Protection is about how the 
use of human shields is prohibited and how the belligerents should act to prevent the appearance 
of the human shields or when they face the human shields. The complexity of the protection 
issue in the context of human shields is that it may be influenced by in/voluntariness, in/direct 
participation in hostilities and status of persons forming the human shield. In should be 
understood the protection of voluntary human shields and protection of involuntary human 
shields are two distinct protections which may somehow overlap and become repetitive. The 
peculiarity presented as the difference in protection is well proved by the application of the 
principle of proportionality, for example. 
 
In general, the principle of proportionality is about counting how many civilian deaths may be 
justified when it is the reaching of military objective. It is believed that proportionality principle 
should be fully applied to involuntary human shields. As for voluntary human shields, there is 
no common agreement how the principle should be applied, and this constitutes a problem. On 
the one hand, it is possible to suppose the principle of proportionality is not to be applicable. 
The possible reasoning can be that persons, who intentionally take part in hostilities, become 
legitimate target and, hence, are not protected from the attack. On the other hand, it is possible 
to suppose the principle of proportionality is to be fully applicable. The reasoning may be the 
persons, who intentionally form human shield, are manipulated and/or possibly presumed to be 
considered innocent civilians. The issue of proportionality principle is believed to be crucial for 
the human shields,2 but it is not the only one existing in the context of their protection. 
 
1 Supreme Court of Israel HCJ 769/02, Public Committee v. Government of Israel (Targeted Killings), 
Judgement, 13 December 2006 
2 G. D. Solis. The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2010, p. 320 
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Even though the issue of human shields is not a new one, it remains sharp. The armed conflicts 
have not stopped occurring, and the use of human shields tends to happen. The topic of this 
thesis is relevant because of the reason there are legal gaps in the international legal regulation 
of human shields in time, when human shields are actively used. This thesis contains possible 
solutions to the challenges needed to be overcome. Hence, it contributes to the development of 
the human shields concept. Additionally, thesis clearly differentiates voluntary and involuntary 
human shields. Accordingly, it enables to see in detail the difference in international legal 
regulation of them. Also, the thesis tackles with issue of the human shields’ status. The provided 
determination can assist in establishing the status by the authorized body, for example. Along 
with the above mentioned, the thesis provides the detailed interpretation of the human shield 
crime under international criminal law. This can possibly simplify and justify brining criminals 
to the justice for the use of voluntary human shields. 
 
The object of the thesis is the international legal regulation of human shields. In this work, the 
basis of human shields, their status and the protections are covered under the framework of 
international legal regulation. The three mentioned parts of the concept of human shields are 
the difficult questions under international law. All of them have certain legal gaps needed to be 
fulfilled. The part on the basis is about the basics of human shields and the challenges to these 
basics. In its turn, the regulation of status relates to the actual legal status of human shields, its 
peculiarities and solutions to the existing problems. As for the protection of human shields, it 
is about the actual extent of protections and solutions to the challenges related to the issue under 
consideration. 
 
The research problem lies in the presence of challenges to the issue how international law 
regulates human shields. The main challenges relate to the human shields’ status and protection. 
These challenges largely appear from the basics of the human shields concept, the reality that 
human shields can practically be voluntary and involuntary, and the fact that their activity can 
be considered direct or indirect participation in hostilities. Consequently, there is a dilemma of 
the correct factual determination of the status. In view of the fact that the specific status is 
supposed to have the specific protections, there also is a dilemma how the person, who does 
not act according to his/her status, is protected.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to establish the status of human shields, determine what the protection 
of human shields entails, and to fill the existing gaps. Considering the complexity of the topic, 
the author of this thesis defined the hypothesis and three research questions. The hypothesis of 
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this study is that human shields do not suffer changes of status during the participation in 
hostilities, the regulation of human shields protection is weakly developed, and there is a place 
for the development of international legal regulation of human shields in the context of existing 
legal gaps. As for the research questions, the following questions are posted in this work: 
 
1. How does international law regulate the status of human shields? 
2. How does international law regulate the protection of human shields? 
3. What are the legal gaps in international legal regulation of human shields? 
 
The author of this thesis used several research methods in this thesis work. The systematic 
research method was largely used in this thesis. For example, a number of journal articles on 
the correlation between the human shields and the principle of proportionality were critically 
analyzed, and it resulted in discovering the legal gap in the context of application of the 
proportionality principle to the voluntary human shields. It became crystal clear that there is a 
dilemma whether the application should be relaxed, disregarded or fully applicable. As for the 
analytical research method, it also was largely used. As an example, it enabled to discover that 
voluntary human shields have the civilian status and their status cannot be considered the 
combatant status.  
 
The qualitative research method was also used in order to have comprehensive analysis of the 
sources, which provide with theoretical knowledge. Essentially, it enabled to discover the 
originality of the human shields concept and its certain dependence on the concept of direct 
participation in hostilities, for example. In addition, the method of interpretation was used to 
interpret the provisions of international instruments. The method enabled to establish that 
provisions of international humanitarian law prohibiting human shielding are equally applicable 
to both involuntary and voluntary human shields, for instance. Besides the above-mentioned 
methods, the quantitative method was used in respect to the jurisprudence. As a result, the 
practical possibility of the application of the provisions on human shields was found out and 
the peculiarities of the application were established. For example, the method enabled to see 
that the prohibition to use human shields practically covers not only civilians, but the 
combatants taken as hostages too. 
 
The thesis work consists of three chapters, which are designed to answer all the research 
question and achieve the objective. The first chapter focuses on the human shield basis in 
international law. At first, it examines the approaches of international humanitarian law and 
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international criminal law to the concept of human shield. It results in finding out the peculiarity 
that humanitarian law approaches the shields as prohibited method of warfare while the criminal 
law addresses it as a war crime. Then, the chapter determines a number of peculiarities of human 
shields. It finds the legal gap existing as an absence of the definition of human shields and it 
presents a possible solution to the problem. After, the chapter explores the relationship between 
the direct participation in hostilities. As a result, it establishes the dependence of human shields 
concept on the concept of the direct participation as well as existence of the genuine link 
between the voluntary human shields and direct participation, and the correlation between the 
indirect participation in hostilities and involuntary human shields. At last, the chapter draws a 
clear line between the treachery, when combatants pretend to be civilians, and the factual 
human shielding. Accordingly, it shows the originality as a feature of the human shields 
concept. 
 
As for the second chapter, it has a precise look at the status of human shields and the legal 
issues connected with. At first, it examines the status of involuntary human shields. As a result, 
it establishes that involuntary human shields always retain their original status and, hence, 
suffer no changes in the status. Additionally, it determines the peculiarities of status 
determination when the involuntary human shield consists of the United Nations Peacekeepers. 
Then, the chapter addresses the issue of status of voluntary human shields as a legal problem 
and resolves a dilemma of the status determination. Step by step it discovers that voluntary 
human shields cannot be considered combatants, the levee en masse or the persons 
accompanying the armed forces. Besides that, it proves the civilian status of voluntary human 
shields and it argues the status of these shields is considered neither a legal problem nor a 
subject to changes. 
 
The third chapter deals with the issue of international legal regulation in the context of human 
shields protection. In essence, it establishes how international law deters parties to conflict from 
the use of human shields and how human shields are protected from the dangers of attack. At 
first, the chapter discovers that involuntary human shields are subject to the protection 
prescribed to the original status of the members of the shield and there is no relaxing in this 
context. As for the voluntary human shields, the chapter shows they may be a subject to the 
loss of basic protections. Then, the chapter determines the duties of the parties to the conflict 
in the context of human shields. Therefore, it shows how the belligerent may act to prevent the 
appearance and use of human shields, and it also shows how the belligerent should act when it 
faces the human shielding. At last, the chapter addresses two main legal gaps in the context of 
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human shields protection. It defines the problem of the proportionality principle and the 
prohibition to use human shields during non-international armed conflict, and it provides with 
the possible solutions. 
 
The main bibliography consists of international instruments such as the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, the Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1907 Hague 
Convention, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The jurisprudence also 
has place in bibliography. The special attention is given to the practice of the International 
Court of Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia. As for the soft 
law, it also is referenced in this thesis and is mainly represented by the resolutions of the United 
Nations Secretary General, the United Nations Security Council, and the United Nations 
Human Rights Council. The bibliography is not limited to the above-mentioned sources, 
however. The author also gives special attention to the books, journal articles and chapters in 
the books, which are written by authoritative legal experts. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: international humanitarian law, human shields, status, direct participation, 
protection  
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1. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL BASIS OF HUMAN SHIELDS 
 
The human shields concept may not be considered a brand-new in international law. Its 
reflection can be found in various sources of international law. There is a recognized 
international law custom to refrain from the usage of human shields,3 for example. Provisions 
on human shields also are in a number of international instruments, and the prominent examples 
are the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute.4 Additionally, the cases involving 
human shields usage were held in international courts, and the Demiray case5 is an example. At 
first sight it may be assumed the human shields concept is well developed. Nevertheless, this is 
only the first sight and the issue of human shields is a complex question, which contains several 
legal gaps needed to be filled. This chapter focuses on the international legal basis of human 
shields and provides an analysis of two issues. First, it discovers the place of the human shields 
concept in international law. Second, it conducts analysis in order to define the human shields. 
 
1.1. The concept of human shields in international law 
 
The concept of human shields is complex one and it reflected in several branches of 
international law. There are two branches of international law, which address the issue of 
human shields, to pay particular attention to. They are international humanitarian law and 
international criminal law. The key is that in relation to human shields, these branches are 
tightly connected. For example, international humanitarian law considers the prevention of 
human shields usage in armed conflicts while international criminal law implies the legal 
consequences coming from the use of human shields. In other words, one of the mentioned 
branches is about protections and prohibitions, and another one is about bearing liability and 
delivering justice, but both of them relate to the same subject, which is human shields.  
 
Because of the above-mentioned reasons the analysis of human shields concept will not be 
enough accurate and rigorous if it is done only under the framework of only one branch of 
international law. Understanding the complexity of the concept under the question, the author 
 
3 J.-M. Henckaerts, L. Doswald-Beck (eds). Customary International Humanitarian Law. Vol. I, Rules. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005, p. 337 
4 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 
Geneva 12.08.1949, e.i.f. 21.10.1950, Art. 19 (hereinafter: Geneva Convention I); Convention (III) Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva 12.08.1949, e.i.f. 21.10.1950, Art. 23.2 (hereinafter: Geneva 
Convention III); Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva 
12.08.1949, e.i.f. 21.10.1950, Art. 28 (hereinafter: Geneva Convention IV); Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, Rome 17.07.1998, e.i.f. 01.07.2002, Art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii) (hereinafter: Rome Statute) 
5 ECtHR 27308/95, Demiray v Turkey, 21.11.2000 
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of the thesis analyses the concept of human shields under two mentioned branches of 
international law and delivers it in this sub-chapter. First, the research on the approach to human 
shields, which is had by international humanitarian law, is delivered. Second, the sub-chapter 
provides an analysis on the human shields concept under international criminal law.  
 
1.1.1. International humanitarian law approach to human shields  
 
International humanitarian law is quite rich on the provisions prohibiting the use of human 
shields. These provisions can be found in of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. For example, the 
Geneva Convention I precludes from the use of medical personnel as human shields.6 In its 
turn, the Geneva Convention III prohibits the use of human shields formed by the prisoners of 
war.7 As for the Geneva Convention IV, it says “the presence of a protected person may not be 
used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations”.8 Along with the 
Geneva Conventions, the Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions also include a 
few provisions on human shields. 
 
There are two provisions on human shields in the Protocol I. At first, the Protocol prohibits the 
use of human shields formed by the medical personnel.9 At second, it prohibits the using 
civilians as human shields.10 As for the Additional Protocol II, it does not contain an explicit 
prohibition to use human shields. However, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
explains the Protocol II contains the article, which may be considered in the context of human 
shields.11 The article says “the civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general 
protection against the dangers arising from military operations”.12 Besides, Stéphanie Bouchié 
de Belle believes there are two more articles in the Protocol II, which can be used to in respect 
to the rule prohibiting the use of human shields. According to her, it is the Article 5(2)(c) on 
evacuation from the areas of combat, and it is the Article 4(2)(c) on the hostage-taking.13 
However, there also is a detail which should be noted along with the above-mentioned. 
 
6 Geneva Convention I, Art. 19 
7 Geneva Convention III, Art. 23 
8 Geneva Convention IV, Art. 28 
9 Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of 
international armed conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva 08.06.1977, e.i.f. 07.12.1978, Art. 12.4 (hereinafter: 
Additional Protocol I) 
10 Ibid., Art. 51.7 
11 Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck (eds). Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 3, p. 338 
12 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of 
non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II), Geneva 28.06.1977, e.i.f. 07.12.1978, Art. 13.1 (hereinafter: 
Additional Protocol II) 
13 S. B. De Belle. Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on Their T-Shirts: Human Shields in International 
Humanitarian Law. – International Review of the Red Cross 2008/90 (872), p. 887 
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According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the prohibition to use human shield 
is the norm of customary law and is applicable in both types of armed conflict – international 
and non-international.14 Also, Stéphanie Bouchié de Belle emphasizes that in the context of 
non-international armed conflict, it is more appropriate to refer specifically to the customary 
character of the rule prohibiting the use of human shields.15 Accordingly, it becomes crystal 
clear that the prohibition to use of human shields is covered by both international customary 
law and international instruments, and is applicable in both types of armed conflicts – 
international and non-international. Altogether, specifically all the above-mentioned constitute 
the international legal framework of human shields in the contest of international humanitarian 
law. 
 
There also are a number of details, which deserve particular emphasis. To begin with, the legal 
framework on the human shields addresses the use of them as a prohibited method of warfare, 
but the framework does not distinguish between the voluntary and involuntary human shields. 
Therefore, it does not mean to have legal provisions relating only to the one type of human 
shields. It should be understood the human shields almost always are civilians, who have an 
explicit protection from the direct attack.16 Hence, the provisions mean to prohibit the use of 
both types of human shields – voluntary and involuntary. However, Tobias Vestner notes the 
prohibition to use human shields has relation only to persons, but it is not applicable to the 
civilian objects.17 Hence, attack on the military object, which tried to imitate civilian object, 
will not constitute the violation of humanitarian law.18 Thus, the prohibition to use human 
shields refers to the persons but not to the objects. 
 
Additionally, Marco Sassoli explains the violation of prohibition to use human shields is 
different from the violation of the rule on taking precautionary measures,19 which targets the 
general protections prescribed to civilians. According to him, the intent is a key factor, which 
distinguish these two concepts from each other.20 Accordingly, when the belligerent has intent 
to benefit from the civilian presence, it is violation of the rule prohibiting the use human shields;  
 
14 Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck (eds). Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 3, p. 337 
15 De Belle. Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on Their T-Shirts, supra note 13, p. 887 
16 Additional Protocol I, Art. 51.2 
17 T. Vestner. Addressing the Use of Human Shields. – GCSP Strategic Security Analysis 2019/8, p. 6 
18 Ibid., p. 6 
19 M. Sassòli. International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in 
Warfare. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2019, p. 369 
20 Ibid., p. 369 
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but when the belligerent ignores the presence of civilians, it shows the belligerent does not take 
the precautionary measures.21 Hence, it is already possible to see the features of originality of 
the concept of human shields. 
 
Nevertheless, it will be wrong to conclude the concept of human shields is overdeveloped, and 
there are no gaps, questions and uncertainties. The most of doubts relate to the status of human 
shields and, thus, to protection prescribed to them. The possibility of human shields to have 
voluntary and involuntary character makes ask questions how to classify the participants of 
human shields and how to effectively protect them. Also, even though the concept of human 
shields has features of independency, it should not be left apart that this concept still overlaps 
with some other concepts under international humanitarian law. As an example, it has tight 
relations with the concept of direct participation in hostilities and with the concept of the 
principles of international humanitarian law. This list is not exhaustive, however.  
 
1.1.2. International criminal law approach to human shields 
In the context of international criminal law, it is appropriate to start with the issue how the 
International Criminal Court addresses the question of human shields. The Rome Statute says 
“utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain points, areas or 
military forces immune from military operations” and it classifies the human shielding as a war 
crime.22 The crime of the use of human shields has four determining features, and these features 
are elements of crime. They are the using the presence of people protected under international 
humanitarian law for the military benefit, the intent to shield specific military objective, the 
resorting to the use of human shields during the international armed conflict, and the knowing 
of perpetrator about the existence of such conflict.23 In general, the Rome Statute and the 
elements of crime represent the basic legal framework of the crime of use of human shields 
under the international criminal law. 
There is a number of peculiarities, however. To begin with, the use of human shields is not 
considered a grave breach.24 Additionally, Stéphanie Bouchié de Belle emphasizes the human 
shielding is not a matter of fact for international criminal law if the crime was committed in 
 
21 Ibid., p. 369 
22 Rome Statute, Art. 8.2(b)(xxiii) 
23 International Criminal Court. Elements of Crimes. The Hague: ICC 2011, p. 30 
24 G. Werle, F. Jessberger. Principles of International Criminal Law. 3d ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2014, para. 1373 
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time of non-international armed conflict.25 The reason for this is quite obvious. As it was 
already stated, the war crime of using human shields requires to be committed during 
international armed conflict. Hence, the resorting to the use of human shields will not be 
prosecuted at the International Criminal Court if it happens during the inner conflict, for 
example. However, it does not preclude from the prosecution in national courts. 
Additionally, Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessbeger explain the use of human shields suggests 
two situations,26 which differ from each other at the first sight, but they have the same intent if 
to give careful consideration to. The situations are the placing specific military object in the 
area with high civilian population in order to shield, and the engaging civilian to shield the 
military object situated on the battlefield.27 As for the relation to the elements of crime, the 
element of benefiting from civilian presence is not described in details. Hence, it is possible to 
conclude that both mentioned situations meet the requirement of benefitting and, hence, are 
covered by the crime. 
Some light should be shed on the details of fact, that the Rome Statute addresses the war crime 
of the use of human shields as the use of persons.28 Hence, it may be presumed the crime 
excludes the use of voluntary human shields. Guo Yang explains that in the context of war 
crime the voluntary human shields do not meet this requirement of being used since they are 
willfully shielding.29 Hence, the belligerent, which resorted to the use of voluntary human 
shields, should not be the responsible at the court.30 This is arguable, however. According to 
Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessbeger, when the belligerent employs human shields to shield 
the military objective, this is a situation of war crime.31 In this case, employment suggests the 
voluntary character but remains to be a crime. In addition, the Rome Statute and the elements 
of crime do not explicitly require that persons were forced to form the human shields. Thus, it 
may be concluded that war crime of the use of human shields covers the use of both voluntary 
and involuntary shields. 
 
 
25 De Belle. Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on Their T-Shirts, supra note 13, p. 887 
26 Werle, Jessberger. Principles of International Criminal Law, supra note 24, para. 1376 
27 Ibid., para. 1376 
28 Rome Statute, Art. 8.2(b)(xxiii) 
29 G. Yang. The Grave Breaches Regime of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: Origins, Developments and 
Prospects. – M. Bergsmo, C. Wui Ling, S. Tianying, Y. Ping (eds). Historical Origins of International Criminal 
Law. Vol. 3. Brussels: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher 2015, p. 382 
30 Ibid., p. 382 
31 Werle, Jessberger. Principles of International Criminal Law, supra note 24, para. 1376 
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As for judicial bodies, it should be understood the International Criminal Court is not the only 
one, which deals with the such war crime as human shielding. For example, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia also prosecuted the crime under the question. The 
Tribunal showed that the war crime of human shielding has connections with other crimes. For 
example, in the Kvocka case, the use of human shields was compared to and classified as cruel 
treatment.32 The court practice is not limited to the mentioned case, however.  For example, in 
the Blaskic case the human shielding was also considered cruel treatment, and it was reasoned 
by the statement that members of human shield suffered mental harm and their human dignity 
was attacked.33 The peculiarity of this case is the following. It established the prohibition to use 
human shields even if the possibility of attack directed against them is excluded.34 Altogether, 
it is possible to see that the war of use of human shields does not relate to the very limited 
situations, but it covers a broad area.  
1.2. Determination of human shields 
 
Knowing the place of human shields concept in international law and still talking about the 
international legal basis of human shields, it also is quite important to be able to understand 
who and what human shields are. This is because of the reason the proper understanding enables 
to correctly determine them and prevent the appearance of confusions. This sub-chapter 
discovers the definition of human shields at first. Then, it analyses the correlation between the 
human shields and direct participation in hostilities, and, thus, it discovers whether the usage 
of human shields necessarily means that participants of shields conduct the direct participation 
in hostilities. At last, it establishes the distinction between the perfidy and human shielding. 
 
1.2.1. Definition of human shields 
 
The peculiarity of the human shields concept is that it does not have explicit definition under 
international law, and in every other branch of international law, where the human shields 
concept reflected, too. To all intents and purposes, human shields are addressed as somewhat 
of prohibited method or process. The presence of the definition, which determines who human 
shields are could possibly contribute to the simplification of determination of human shields 
status, which is problematic. The further research should be conducted in order to establish the 
proposal of possible definition and, thus, to facilitate the development of the concept. 
 
32 ICTY IT-98-30/1-T, Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvocka et al., Judgement, 2 November 2001, para. 161 
33 ICTY IT-95-14-A, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Judgement, 29 July 2004, para. 653, 669 
34 Ibid., para. 654 
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The first approach to the process of definition determination is simple one and is based on the 
dictionary application. It should be noted the reference to the dictionaries is justified on the 
base, that it is a common practice of international courts to refer to the dictionaries in order to 
find out the meaning of undefined term. For example, three dictionaries were used by the 
International Court of Justice in the Oil Platforms case,35 and the reference to the dictionary 
was also made by the court in the Avena case.36 In addition to the practice of the International 
Court of Justice, the World Trade Organization frequently invoke the dictionaries37 too. 
Additionally, states accept the approach of clarification of term by referring to the dictionaries. 
The Netherlands used dictionary in its request for advisory opinion in respect to the meaning 
of the term ‘people’,38 for instance. 
 
Due to the fact that such authoritative sources as the Dictionary of the International Law of 
Armed Conflict39 and the Black’s Law Dictionary40 do not give meaning of the term ‘human 
shield’, there is a need to refer to other dictionaries. The Oxford dictionary interprets the human 
shields as “person or group of people”41 while the Dictionary of Military Terms addresses the 
human shields as a “group of hostages”.42 In essence, the definition of human shields is 
represented in a quite broad way by the dictionaries, and this circumstance does not really 
enable to approach the precise definition. Alternatively, it is significant to analyze legal 
instruments and judicial practice in order to determine who are human shields.  
 
First, the Rome Statute addresses the members of human shields as “civilian or other protected 
persons”.43 Additionally, the 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibit the use of human shields 
formed by medical personnel, prisoners of war, and “protected persons”.44 As for the Additional 
 
35 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 1996, p. 803, para. 45 
36 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 
12, para. 84 
37 WTO WT/DS257/AB/R, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain 
Softwood Lumber from Canada, Report of the Appellate Body, 17.02.2004, para. 58; WTO 
WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Decision by the 
Arbitrator, 31.08.2004, para. 248; WTO WT/DS285/AB/R, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, Report of the Appellate Body, 20.04.2005, para. 164 
38 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for an Advisory Opinion), Written Comments of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, International Court of Justice, 17.07.2009, para. 3.6 
39 P. Verri. Dictionary of the International Law of Armed Conflict. Geneva: International Committee of the Red 
Cross 1992 
40 B. A. Garner. Black’s Law Dictionary. 11th Edition. St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters 2019 
41 A. Stevenson. Oxford Dictionary of English. 3d Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010, p. 854 
42 R. Bowyer. Dictionary of Military Terms. 3d Edition. London: A&C Black 2007, p. 121 
43 Rome Statute, 8(2)(b)(xxiii) 
44 Geneva Convention I, Art. 19; Geneva Convention III, Art. 23.1; Geneva Convention IV, Art. 28 
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Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the members of human shields are addressed as 
medical personnel and civilians.45 In total, all these kinds of members are not combatants and 
are protected persons under the 1949 Geneva regulations. 
 
As for the judicial practice of international courts, civilians were defined as members of human 
shields in the Karadzic and Mladic case by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia.46 The usage of civilians and child soldiers as human shields was emphasized 
multiple times in the AFRC Accused case by the Special Court for Sierra Leone case,47 for 
example. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights emphasized the usage of civilians as 
human shields in the Santo Domingo Massacre case48 in 2012. Additionally, the use of the 
detained civilians as human shields was highlighted in the number of cases held by the Court 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.49 It should be noted this list of cases is not exhausted, but 
nevertheless, it sheds some light in the tendency in human shield membership. 
 
Alternatively, it should be mentioned that international organizations also do not stand on the 
sidelines, but they have certain activity on the issue of human shields. The United Nations 
Organization is on the leading positions and, for example, in 1996, there was a report, which 
was prepared by the Secretary-General, that civilians were used as human shields in Liberia,50 
as well as there was report on Sierra Leone, where it was noted that civilians were forced to 
form human shields.51 Additionally, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
mentioned that use of civilians as human shields by the Palestinian forces.52 Nevertheless, the  
 
45 Additional Protocol I, Art. 12.4, 51.7 
46 ICTY IT-95-5-I, The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, Initial Indictment, 
24.07.1995, para. 48 
47 SCSL SCSL-04-16-T, Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (the 
AFRC Accused), Judgement, 20 June 2007, para. 236, 1275, 1384, 1447, 1452 
48 Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, Judgement, IACtHR, 30.11.2012, para. 5 
49 WCS BiH 1st Inst. X-KR-03-16, Prosecutor v. Dragole Paunovic, Verdict, 26 May 2006, para. 2; WCS BiH 
1st Inst. X-KR-05-51, Prosecutor v. Dragan Damjanovic, Verdict, 15 December 2006, para. 6; WCS BiH 1st 
Inst. X-KR-07/442, Prosecutor v. Kujundzic Predrag, Verdict, 30 October 2009, para. 3, 408, 430, 437, 450 
50 UN Secretary General (UNSG), Fifteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Observer Mission in Liberia, 23 January 1996, S/1996/47, para. 24 
51 UN Security Council (UNSC), First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 
12 August 1998, S/1998/750, para. 33, 36 
52 UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
on the implementation of Human Rights Council resolutions S-9/1 and S-12/1, Addendum : The human rights 
situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory between 12 June and 26 August 2014, including the escalation in 
hostilities between the State of Israel and Palestinian armed groups in Gaza, 26 December 2014, 
A/HRC/28/80/Add.1, para. 31 
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United Nations is not the only one organization, which reacts on the human shields use. It was 
also done by such international non-governmental organizations as the Amnesty International53 
and the Human Rights Watch,54 for example. This list is not exhaustive, however. 
 
Considering all the above-mentioned, it becomes crystal clear that there is a need to make an 
emphasis on the civilians as human shields but without omission of other protected group of 
persons. Thus, human shields are person or group of persons, who are civilians or another 
protected person, who voluntary or involuntary are utilized by belligerents in a certain area in 
order to achieve certain military objectives e.g. deter attack. It is understandable that proposed 
definition may be disputable. Nevertheless, the definition is acceptable and is an alternative to 
the absence. 
 
1.2.2. Direct participation in hostilities 
 
To begin with, the nature of human shields, if they are voluntary or involuntary formed, 
suggests that members of any kind of shield are differently involved in the course of hostilities. 
Consequently, it may be assumed that kind of participation in hostilities (direct or indirect) 
depends on the nature of human shields. Accordingly, while the indirect participation is 
supposed to result in achieving military objectives but is not supposed to result in direct harming 
the enemy, the direct participation is about hostile conduct which belongs to the hostilities 
conduct between parties to the conflict.55 As for the human shields, direct participation in 
hostilities is usually used in the context of voluntary human shields while indirect participation 
is regularly used in the context of involuntary human shields. 
 
It should be noted, by itself the international humanitarian law does not contain prohibition, 
which supposes that person should deter from the direct participation in hostilities.56 However, 
under international humanitarian law direct participation in hostilities exists along with active 
 
53 Amnesty International, Israel - Lebanon: Out of All Proportion - Civilians Bear the Brunt of the War, 21 
November 2006, AI Index: MDE 02/033/2006. Available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/76000/mde020332006en.pdf (27.01.2020), p. 60-69 
54 Human Rights Watch. Dead Men Walking: Convict Porters on the Front Lines in Eastern Burma. New York: 
Human Rights Watch 2011, p. 35-39 
55 N. Melzer. International Humanitarian Law: A Comprehensive Introduction. Geneva: International Committee 
of the Red Cross 2016, p. 87 
56 A. McDonald. Ghosts in the Machine: Some Legal Issues Concerning US Military Contractors in Iraq: Essays 
in Honor of Yoram Dinstein. – M. Schmitt, J. Pejic (eds). International Law and Armed Conflict: Exploring the 
Faultlines. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007, p. 400 
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participation in hostilities. For example, the 1949 Geneva Conventions use the word “active”57 
while the Additional Protocols use the term “direct”.58 This may possibly lead to confusions. 
Due to that fact, there is a need to clarify whether there is any difference between direct and 
active participation in hostilities. 
 
At first sight it may be supposed that mentioned terms are different. Nevertheless, the legal 
adviser at the International Committee of the Red Cross Nils Melzer explains that difference 
only is in wording of English version of the instruments but there is no difference in the context, 
and, for example, authentic French version of the instruments includes only one wording, which 
is “participent directement”, and, thus, there is no difference between direct and active 
participation in hostilities.59 Also, prominent scholar in the field of international humanitarian 
law Avril McDonald analyzed the civilian contractors as armed forces members and she 
highlighted that even marginal difference cannot be applied.60 Additionally, in the Akayesu case 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda defined that direct participation and active 
participation in hostilities are synonymic terms.61 Hence, the terms have no difference and are 
the same. 
 
Peculiarity of the voluntary human shields is that their conduct in hostilities may be considered 
either direct participation or indirect participation, and this depends on circumstances.62 As for 
the circumstances, in the Targeted Killing case the court defined that in case the voluntary 
human shields acted with intent to support the activity of terrorist organization, then it is the 
case of direct participation in hostilities.63 The court also stated that if persons are forced to 
form a human shield, then it is indirect participation in hostilities.64 Nevertheless, the 
circumstance, which defines if the shields were formed voluntarily or not, is not the only one 
which contributes to the determination whether it is direct or indirect participation in hostilities. 
 
57 Geneva Convention I, Art. 3; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva 12.08.1949, e.i.f. 21.10.1950, Art. 3 (hereinafter: 
Geneva Convention II); Geneva Convention III, Art. 3; Geneva Convention IV, Art. 3 
58 Additional Protocol I, Art. 43.2, 51.3, 67.1.E; Additional Protocol II, Art. 13.3 
59 N. Melzer. Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 
Humanitarian Law: Adopted by the Assembly of the International Committee of the Red Cross on 26 February 
2009. – International Review of the Red Cross 2008/90 (872), p. 1013-1014 
60 McDonald. Ghosts in the Machine, supra note 56, p. 400 
61 ICTR ICTR-96-4-T, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, 2 September 1998, para. 629 
62 J. Romer. Killing in a Gray Area between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights: How Can the National 
Police of Colombia Overcome the Uncertainty of Which Branch of International Law to Apply? Uelzen: 
Springer 2010, p. 56 
63 S. Bosch. Targeting Decisions involving Voluntary Human Shields in International Armed Conflicts in Light 
of the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities. – The Comparative and International Law Journal of 
Southern Africa 2013/46 (3), p. 458 
64 L. Rewi. Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in Hostilities and the International Humanitarian Law 
Obligations of States. – Melbourne Journal of International Law 2008/9 (2), p. 320 
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According to Michel L. Gross, the determination whether voluntary human shields take direct 
or indirect participation in hostilities depends on the circumstance if their conduct represents 
facilitation or forestalling of attack.65 Also, the scholar provides the following examples with 
aid, which can be possibly provided by the human shields voluntarily formed. First, when the 
voluntary human shields provide the war-sustaining aid in the form of supplying depot, or 
protecting militias who are retreating, the shielding headquarters which belong to the military 
command of party to the conflict, and then the conduct should be considered indirect 
participation in hostilities.66 In contrast, when the voluntary human shields conduct the aid 
which is the war-fighting and actually is protection of the militias attacking or shielding missile 
launcher which is primed, for example, then the conduct of human shields should be considered 
direct participation in hostilities.67 These examples are practical and make it crystal clear how 
exactly the division of conduct of voluntary human shields on direct and indirect participation 
in hostilities can actually be done. 
 
Nevertheless, it should be noted the development of the concept of the direct participation in 
hostilities began only in 2009. Before that year there was no real clarification what direct 
participation in hostilities is. As of today, it is possible to see flexibility in division into direct 
and indirect participation in hostilities in the context of voluntary human shields, but then it 
was a difficult question. For example, analyzing the conduct of voluntary human shields 
Stéphanie Bouchié de Belle stated that even if the voluntary human shields may possibly 
contribute to war capabilities and be a threat to the militias of another party to the conflict, the 
threat cannot be considered immediate, and thus, the voluntary human shields take only indirect 
participation in hostilities.68 However, there also is a contrary view to the indirect participation 
in hostilities as a feature of voluntary human shields. 
 
According to Michael N. Schmitt, there is no doubt that act of voluntary human shields always 
constitute direct participation, and this is because the conduct is willful.69 In essence, it shows 
somewhat of absolutism in respect to the voluntary human shielding and the type of 
participation in hostilities they represent – strictly indirect or mandatory direct one. As of today,  
 
65 M. L. Gross. The Ethics of Insurgency: A Critical Guide to Just Guerrilla Warfare. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2015, p. 133 
66 Ibid., p. 134, Table 6.2. 
67 Ibid., p. 134, Table 6.2. 
68 De Belle. Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on Their T-Shirts, supra note 13, p. 894-895 
69 M. N. Schmitt. Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian 
Employees. – Chicago Journal of International Law 2005/5 (2), p. 541 
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legal research has moved from the absolutism of in/direct participation, it shows the factual 
development of law and its ability to adapt to the changing circumstances. Nevertheless, it is 
the legal field changed its approach only to the participation of voluntary human shields. 
 
As for involuntary human shields and their participation in hostilities, it should be noted that 
division on direct and indirect participation in hostilities applies only to the voluntary human 
shields.70 Analyzing the legal consequences resulting from the use of human shields, Robin 
Geib and James G. Devaney multiple times highlighted that indirect participation in hostilities 
is amounted to the conduct of involuntary human shields while direct participation is not.71 
Additionally, Eduard Hovsepyan explains the key is that when human shield is involuntarily 
formed, then there is a natural link in the form of belligerent nexus between the shield and the 
party using it, and consequently, the conduct of the human shield under the question does not 
represent direct participation in hostilities.72 It it may be concluded and stated once again, that 
involuntary human shields may not be considered as these directly participating in hostilities. 
Hence, in the circumstances, when the conduct of the voluntary human shield would be 
obviously counted as direct participation, the same conduct done by the involuntary human 
shields would be counted as indirect participation in hostilities. 
 
1.2.3. Discrepancy between perfidy and human shielding 
 
International humanitarian law is rich on provisions, which are created to prohibit certain kinds 
of activity in order to secure the good faith of conducting hostilities by parties to the armed 
conflict. The perfidy and human shielding are considered these prohibited activities. However, 
they also are these two kinds, which may possibly be confused between each other. For 
example, the possible confusion may happen when the combatants dress civilian clothes and 
imitate civilians forced to be close to the military objective. It is significant to have a clear line 
between these two crimes.  
 
 
 
70 Gross. The Ethics of Insurgency, supra note 65, p. 133 
71 R. Geib, J.G. Devaney. Zealots, Victims and Captives: Maintaining Adequate Protection of Human Shields in 
Contemporary International Humanitarian Law. – Y. Dinstein (ed). Israel Yearbook on Human Rights. Vol. 47. 
Boston: Brill Nijhoff 2017, p. 24 
72 E. Hovsepyan. Legality of Attacks Against Human Shields in Armed Conflict. – UCL Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 2017/6 (1), p. 181 
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To begin with, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, prohibition of human 
shielding is norm of customary law.73 This rule is also set in two of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, the Additional Protocol I, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court.74 International instruments address the shielding as prohibited method of warfare. As for 
the perfidy, it is set in the Hague Convention IV, the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, and the Rome Statute.75 If to consider the provisions, it is possible to discover 
that international law also addresses the perfidy as prohibited method of warfare. For example, 
the Additional Protocol I describes the perfidy as acting in the manner, which makes the enemy 
believe and betrays the confidence of enemy in regard to the believed subject.76 Being treated 
as a prohibited method of warfare is the common feature of perfidy and the human shielding, 
but these two crimes have a number of differences.  
 
The elements of crime, which are clearly defined under the Rome Statute, are to assist in 
establishing the difference between the perfidy and the human shields. The first element is the 
intent to betray confidence.77 According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, it 
actually is the main and primary feature of the crime of perfidy.78 As for the human shields in 
this mentioned context, they do not mean to betray the confidence. In contrast, their conduct 
suggests the prevention of attack, which is being prepared by the enemy. Accordingly, by 
dressing civilian clothes the combatants betray the enemy’s confidence while the civilians, who 
are placed close to the military objective in order to shield, do not do that. Altogether, the intents 
of mentioned war crimes are distinctively different and do not copy each other, and it 
emphasizes the human shields do not meet the requirement under the consideration. 
 
Another element of perfidy supposes that in the time of pretending, the perpetrator causes 
deaths of or injuring to the members of forces belonging to the enemy.79 As for the human 
shields in the context of this element, it is important to understand that members of human 
shields do not have an intent to harm. They have intent to shield and prevent. Also, it is even 
disputable whether the conduct of human shields may cause a real harm or directly damage the 
enemy. Not all kinds of conduct of human shields are even classified as direct participation in 
 
73 Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck (eds). Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 3, p. 337 
74 Geneva Convention III, Art. 23; Geneva Convention IV, Art.28; Additional Protocol I, Art. 51.7; Rome 
Statute, Art. 8.2(b)(xxiii) 
75 Convention respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, The Hague 18.10.1907, e.i.f. 26.01.1910, Art. 
23(b) (hereinafter: The Hague Convention IV); Additional Protocol I, Art. 37.1; Rome Statute, Art. 8.2(b)(xi) 
76 Additional Protocol I, Art. 37.1 
77 ICC. Elements of Crimes, supra note 23, p. 24 
78 Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck (eds). Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 3, p. 223 
79 ICC. Elements of Crimes, supra note 23, p. 24 
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hostilities, and scholars do not have mutual agreement on the kind of participation in hostilities, 
which is had by human shields. Hence, human shields may not be considered to meet the 
requirement of killing or injuring the enemy. Moreover, the human shields are those, who may 
suffer from the act of shielding. 
 
According to another element of crime which is one more distinguishing feature of the crime 
of perfidy, the persons committing the crime should “belong to an adverse party”.80 In other 
words, perpetrator should be considered an authorized member of the armed forces of the party 
to armed conflict. As for the human shields, their status does not enable to state and conclude 
that human shields are authorized combatants belonging to the armed forces. Moreover, the 
detailed analysis on the status of human shields clearly showed the human shields have civilian 
status.81 Consequently, human shields do not meet the above-mentioned requirement. 
 
The human shielding does not meet requirements of perfidy in the same way as the perfidy does 
not meet the requirements of human shielding. For example, one of the elements of human 
shielding crime is benefiting from the presence of civilian population close to the military 
objective.82 When combatants take off military uniform and dress civilian clothes, they do not 
loose combatant status. Moreover, combatant does not lose his status even in time of resting at 
home, as it was defines by the court in the Kordic case.83 Also, the benefit from presence of 
civilians supposes that belligerent, who prepares to attack, will see the human shields and 
decide to postpone the operation. As for the perfidy, it is about making believe, and after to 
betray and harm. Hence, the combatants imitating civilians do not become civilians, and the 
intent of perfidy differs from the intent of human shielding. As a result, the benefiting 
prescribed to the use of human shields does not happen. 
 
One more element of human shielding is the forces, which resort to the crime, have a desire to 
shield military objectives.84 As it was already stated multiple times, perfidy is to betray and 
harm. The shielding does not cause a direct damage to the forces. Also, the shielding does not 
imitate civilian presence. This is because of the reason the human shields are ipso facto civilians  
 
80 Ibid., supra note 23, p. 24 
81 See Chapter 2 
82 ICC. Elements of Crimes, supra note 23, p. 30 
83 ICTY IT-95-14/2-A, Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, Judgement, 17 December 2004, para. 51 
84 ICC. Elements of Crimes, supra note 23, p. 30 
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and they have an intent to support the specific belligerent or are forced to do that. In total, it 
may be summarized that perfidy may not be considered to meet the requirement of shielding 
the objects which have the military importance and character.  
 
In support to all the above-mentioned, it should also be mentioned that the International 
Committee of the Red Cross made up a list of acts of perfidy. According to this list, the perfidy 
is simulation of being hors de combat, of surrendering, of being protected under the status of 
the medical personnel and so on, of civilian status, and wearing uniforms which show the 
belonging to another party to the conflict.85 If to carefully consider the list provided, it becomes 
possible to see that human shielding is not officially considered an act of perfidy by the Red 
Cross. 
 
There is a strong academic support in respect to the issue that human shieling is different to the 
perfidy. As an example, Vera Rusinova explicitly states that human shielding is not a category 
of and may not be classified as perfidy.86 In addition, Stéphanie Bouchié de Belle, who is 
diplomatic officer with the International Committee of the Red Cross, describes the prohibition 
to use human shields as the rule of war, and additionally emphasizes that rules of law are 
antonymic to the acts of perfidy, and thus, considering human shielding as perfidy is not 
appropriate in legal terms.87 This is not an anonymous decision to not treat human shielding as 
act of perfidy, however. In contrast to the above-mentioned experts and according to Frederic 
de Mulinen, the act of involuntary human shielding is to be considered an act of perfidy.88 
Nevertheless, it is only the rare example of such approach. 
 
 
  
 
85 Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck (eds). Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 3, p. 224 
86 V. Rusinova. Human Shields. – F. Lachenmann, R. Wolfrum (eds). The Law of Armed Conflict and the Use 
of Force: The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2017, p. 455 
87 De Belle. Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on Their T-Shirts, supra note 13, p. 888 
88 F. De Mulinen. Distinction Between Military and Civilian Objects. – C. Tomuschat (ed). Kosovo and the 
International Community: A Legal Assessment. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2002, p. 113 
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2. STATUS OF HUMAN SHIELDS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
To begin with, the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions contains the rule, 
which determines that all persons, who are in power of the adverse party, should have protected 
status up to the moment the competent judicial body determines the actual status.89 When it 
comes to the determination of the status of human shields the doubts arise. The key is that 
in/voluntary character, the kind of participation in hostilities, and the original status of persons 
forming the shield are the main causes of questions in respect to the status of human shields. It 
is quite important to note tha international law does not explicitly divide human shields into 
two categories, which are voluntary and involuntary human shields.  
 
On one hand, it may possibly be unreasonable to have an explicit distinction. According to 
Marco Sassòli, such division is unnecessary in the context of international humanitarian law.90 
Additionally, Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg explains that in practice, and especially in course 
of hostilities, it may be impossible to identify whether the human shield is created on voluntary 
or involuntary basis.91 This is not the one existing approach to the division, however. On 
another hand, Marco Sassòli shows flexibility in respect to the division of human shields into 
voluntary and involuntary. He explicitly defines that distinction is fundamental in the context 
of the criminal law and the law of enforcement operations.92 The author of this thesis believes 
that the key is the following. 
 
There is a question of precautions and legal consequences for the use of and taking part in 
hostilities as a member of human shields. Consequently, the issue of status of human shields is 
not this one, which should be left apart. It basically is significant question which requires 
solution. Hence, taking all the above-mentioned reasons and peculiarities into consideration, 
this chapter carefully considers the status of human shields. Noting the importance of such 
fundamental features as involuntariness and voluntariness, the chapter does not determine the 
status of human shields in general, but it separately discovers the status of voluntary and 
involuntary human shields. Thus, it finds out the status of involuntary human shields at first. 
Then, it determines the status of human shields, which are voluntarily created. 
 
89 Additional Protocol I, Art. 43 
90 Sassòli. International Humanitarian Law, supra note 19, p. 371 
91 W. Heintschel von Heinegg. Asymmetric Warfare. – F. Lachenmann, R. Wolfrum (eds). The Law of Armed 
Conflict and the Use of Force: The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Vol. 2. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2017, p. 103  
92 Sassòli. International Humanitarian Law, supra note 19, p. 371 
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2.1. Status of involuntary human shields 
 
It may be possible to suppose that there are no uncertainties in the determination of the status 
of involuntary human shields. Nevertheless, the reality is different. The key is that involuntary 
human shields may be formed by a variety of persons, and some of them do not cause any 
questions regarding the status of human shield. However, some of them may be a reason for the 
dispute. This sub-chapter focuses on the status on involuntary human shields. First, it discovers 
the status of human shields, which are involuntarily formed by persons who are explicitly 
protected under the Geneva Regulations. Then, it defines the status of involuntary human 
shields, which are formed by the United Nations peacekeepers. 
 
2.1.1. Participants of involuntary human shields under the Geneva regulations 
 
In contrast to the status of voluntary human shields and the status of the human shields 
involuntary formed by the United Nations Peacekeepers, the determination of  status of people, 
who constitute involuntary human shields, does not constitute big challenges. In essence, the 
international humanitarian law ipso facto treats human shields as those formed by specific 
persons mentioned in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol I. 
Additionally, Marco Sassòli emphasizes that involuntary human shields always retain their 
status.93 The key is that this rule mentioned by Sassòli is applicable to all persons, who form 
involuntary human shields, and the analysis down shows how it practically works. 
 
To begin with, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols I do not address the 
issue of human shields by explicit application of this term. Nevertheless, they do address the 
question of human shields. For example, the 1949 Geneva Convention I prohibits the use of 
human shields in respect to medical personnel and it basically says the states bear responsibility 
to deter medical units from being situated in the manner which imperil their safety if there is an 
attack against military objectives.94 Medical personnel have special status under international 
humanitarian law, but once they are used as human shields, they do not lose their status. 
Accordingly, the medical personnel keep having their status and do not become combatants, 
for example.  
 
 
93 Ibid., p. 370 
94 Geneva Convention I, Art. 19 
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In contrast, the 1949 Geneva Convention III does not allow to use human shields formed by the 
prisoners of war and it actually says that it is prohibited to place the prisoners of war in such 
places, where their presence will influence the course of hostilities and will result in rendering 
certain points.95 It should be noted that prisoner of war is a status of combatants, who are in 
power of adverse party and cannot take part in hostilities at time of physical custody, and, 
consequently, are entitled to hors de combat status.96 When persons, which placed hors de 
combat, form non-voluntary human shields, their hors de combat status does not suffer changes 
and these persons keep being hors de combat. Hence, when the hors de combat start taking part 
in hostilities as human shields, the hors de combat do not become active combatant but they 
still fully satisfy the criteria of hors de combat status,97 and they still do have status of hors de 
combat in case of being human shields. 
 
The same happens to the status of other persons who are protected from the use as human 
shields. If the 1949 Geneva Convention IV addresses the issue of human shields and its actual 
wording is “presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas 
immune from military operations”,98 these protected persons still have their status. 
Alternatively, the same applies to human shields addressed by the Additional Protocol I. 
Mentioned protocol says about human shields twice. First, it does so in respect to the medical 
units.99 Then, the Protocol prohibits placing civilians in certain areas in order to shield military 
operations or deter attack.100 According to Yoram Dinstein, the civilians are considered 
innocent civilians,101 and thus, civilians retain their civilian status. 
 
Altogether, every group retains their status in time of being used as involuntary human shields. 
For example, the civilians who are forced to create non-voluntary human shields do not became 
combatants because of the following reasons. First, and as it was already mentioned above in 
the section 1.2.2., when there is involuntary human shield, this shield does not constitute direct 
participation in hostilities. Also, civilians in human shields do not meet requirements of 
combatant status. Combatants are defined in the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, which defines that combatants are “members of the armed forces of a Party to a 
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conflict”.102 Civilians are non-combatants, and this is despite the fact that non-combatants may 
be members of armed forces,103 civilians used as involuntary human shields do not belong to 
armed forces. Moreover, civilians are required to be distinguished from the armed forces.104 
Altogether civilians retain their civilian status. 
 
Additionally, it is quite important to indicate that human shields issue is also addressed by the 
International Criminal Court. Its statute prohibits the usage of civilian persons as human 
shields.105 Also, the guide on the elements of crimes emphasizes utilizing civilians as human 
shields.106 The analysis of elements of human shields crime, which is done by the legal advisor 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Knut Dormann, in cooperation with Louise 
Doswald-Beck and Robert Kolb, couple of times highlights the explicit prohibition to use 
civilians and other protected persons i.e. detainees.107 In essence, it is important to follow the 
common tendency to emphasize the use of civilians as involuntary human shields. As it was 
already stated multiple times, civilians are supposed to and by default have civilian status. Once 
again, civilian status does not disappear once civilians form non-voluntary human shields 
because involuntary human shields do not take direct participation in hostilities. Thus, human 
shields, which are involuntary formed by civilians, retains civilian status. 
 
In general, the status of involuntary human shields can be easily determined and is not 
influenced by such peculiarities as kind of participation in hostilities, for example. The key is 
that legal framework on involuntary human shields is crystal clear and enables to determine the 
status of involuntary human shields without explicit and deep analysis. The framework shows 
that it is to preserve the status of human shields in respect to the status of persons who were 
forced to form the human shield. The key also lies in the fact that the conduct of involuntary 
human shields does not constitute the direct participation in hostilities. Since, involuntary 
human shields and direct participation in hostilities are separated questions, which do not have 
tight connection, there is no need to argue on status of non-voluntary human shields and the 
preservation of their original status. The absence of mentioned link should be understood as the 
main reason which defines that members of involuntary human shields retain the status which 
they had before the moment when they were forced to form the shield. 
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2.1.2. Status of involuntary human shields formed by the United Nations Peacekeepers 
 
It may possibly happen that the military component of the United Nations peacekeeping 
operation plays the role of human shields. The peculiarity of this case is the status of military 
personnel may vary. The key is what status peacekeepers originally had had before they formed 
human shield. Legal expert Róisín Burke emphasizes that status of the UN military forces can 
be found in the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) which are status of forces agreements 
between the host state and the United Nations, and are mission specific.108 SOFAs are probably 
the most significant in relation to status determination because of the reason that they are quite 
detailed.109 One of such agreements was concluded between the United Nations and Haiti in 
2004,110 for instance. 
 
In addition, it should be highlighted that military personnel, which belong to the United Nations 
peacekeeping operation, operate under the United Nations control but still belong to their 
national establishments.111 In other words, it should be understood, for example, soldier, whose 
sending state is the Netherlands and who is wearing the United Nations blue helmet, remains 
to be Dutch soldier in fact. The reality that at the same time, person belongs to the national 
establishment and wears the United Nations blue helmet influences the status of person under 
the question.  Dieter Fleck defines the status of military personnel, which operates on the 
territory of host state, as special one.112 The peculiarity is that it is a dual status, which suggests 
that person retains his position as organ of and in his parent state, and at the same time, he bears 
status, which comes from the international organization,113 which is the United Nations, and 
provides him immunities, which are not generally guaranteed to the national military personnel. 
The consequence of the dual status is that that peacekeepers can be considered both civilians 
and combatants.114 So, the following should be mentioned. 
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According to Alexander Gilder, by default military personnel of the United Nations 
peacekeepers are classified as non-combatants.115 This believe can be considered well-
reasoned. The First Additional Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions defines who are 
combatants and basically says that combatants are “members of the armed forces of a Party to 
a conflict”.116 As for the United Nations peacekeepers, they meet the requirement of being 
armed forces but they do not meet the requirement of belonging to the party to conflict. This is 
because of the reason they factually represent a neutral party. Consequently, the United Nations 
military forces cannot be classified as combatants, and, thus, are classified as non-combatants.  
 
The additional reason to determine peacekeepers as non-combatants is that such status is 
officially recognized in relation to the peacekeepers. For example, determining when 
peacekeepers lose their non-combatant status117 the United Nations Secretary-General confirms 
the non-combatant status of peacekeepers. Besides, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross explains the peacekeepers hold their non-combatant status only in cases when 
peacekeepers have mandate to protect civilians and, thus, when it is peace-enforcement 
operation, the non-combatant status is not applicable to them anymore.118 Accordingly, the 
status of peacekeepers will not be affected if they use weapon in case of self-defense.119 
However, the determination of status of peacekeepers is not really limited to the non-combatant 
status. 
 
Along with the non-combatant status, the peacekeepers basically are soldiers who are treated 
as civilians. That was clearly established during the proceeding at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Karadzic and Mladic case.120 In this case, both 
Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic were accused for “taking of civilians, that is UN 
peacekeepers, as hostages and, additionally, using them as human shields”.121 Nevertheless, 
application of civilian status to peacekeepers is not limited to mentioned court case. The 
doctrinal studies also support the idea that peacekeepers are to be considered the persons 
enjoying the civilian status.  
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For example, Damian Lilly, the Chief of the Protection Division at the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, conducted a research on the status 
of peacekeepers and states that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court applies to 
peacekeepers as to civilians, and, thus, peacekeepers have civilian status.122 On another hand, 
researcher Magdalena Pacholska emphasized that UN peacekeepers are generally entitled to 
civilian status because of the way they use force i.e. in order to defense themselves;123 while 
Conor Foley stated that UN peacekeepers are entitled to civilian status because they do not take 
part in armed conflict as combatant.124 All of that leads to the conclusion that since 
peacekeepers have civilian status, they still keep it after becoming involuntary human shields. 
 
As it was already mentioned, the status of members of human shields depends on what status 
peacekeepers had before they formed the shield. So, civilian status is not the only one possible 
status which can belong to peacekeepers. For example, the activity of the United Nations Force 
Brigade in Congo enabled to believe that the United Nations peacekeeping operations can be 
engaged in conflict as party to it, and thus, peacekeepers can be considered combatants.125 It is 
disputable question whether the United Nations and its peacekeepers can become party to a 
conflict, but mostly the researches are tend to support this concept.126 Nevertheless, approach, 
where peacekeepers are considered to be combatants when the United Nations become a party 
to conflict, is not the only one. 
 
Alternatively, the International Committee of the Red Cross states that once peacekeepers 
engaged in enforcement operations, they enjoy combatant status.127 Nigel D. White also 
believes that status of peacekeepers depends on type of operation they engaged, or in other 
words, status of peacekeepers can be affected by mandate they have.128 This can be explained 
by the following. Usually the mandate of the robust peace operation suggest that military force 
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can be applied at both international and strategic levels.129 Altogether it shows that it is possible 
for peacekeepers to enjoy the combatant status. And as for combatant status during enforcement 
operation, it also should be noted that combatant status is had by the peacekeepers during all 
the period of operation, where they are on duty. However,  it happens only to the moment, when 
they use weapon in order to protect the mandate, for example. Hence, it really is about having 
combatant status and it is not about losing protection guaranteed to non-combatant civilian 
status.  
 
The combatant status supposes that it can be changed to hors de combat or prisoner of war, for 
example. The same change of status applies to the peacekeepers, which are considered 
combatants. For example, during proceeding on Karadzic case the Trial Chamber’s opinion 
was emphasized and that opinion was “even if the UN [P]ersonnel were combatants 
immediately before their detention, they were rendered ‘hors de combat”.130 Hence, if 
peacekeepers, who originally were considered to be combatants, constitute involuntary human 
shields, now they should be considered as hors de combat, who constitute involuntary human 
shields. 
 
2.2. Status of voluntary human shields 
 
Controversy surrounding voluntary human shields arises when there is a need to define their 
status. The thing is that members of the voluntary human shields create human shields based 
on their personal will, and they basically may influence the course of hostilities, and 
consequently, their conduct may be possibly classified as directly participation in hostilities. 
Their intent and participation in hostilities cause a doubt how voluntary human shields should 
be classified and whether they lose original status or retain it in the same manner as it happens 
with the involuntary human shields.  
 
Taking into account the before-mentioned presumption on the determination of status by the 
authoritative judicial bodies the legal expert Shannon Bosch believes that if to compare the 
voluntary human shields with other categories of persons under international humanitarian law, 
it may possibly help courts during the proceedings on human shields.131 Besides that, the 
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determination of status of involuntary human shields, which is made on the base of 
comparisons, may possibly contribute to the development of the concept of human shields in 
general.  
 
This sub-chapter is to discover the status of voluntary human shields and it does that on the 
base of the following comparisons. First, the sub-chapter analyses whether voluntary human 
shields are endowed with combatant status. Second, it discovers whether the levée en masse 
status is this one, which is enjoyed by the voluntary human shields. Third, the sub-chapter finds 
out whether voluntary human shields constitute the persons accompanying armed forces. At 
last, it discovers whether voluntary human shields meet the requirements of civilian status. 
 
2.2.1. Combatant status of voluntary human shields 
 
When it comes to the determination of the status of voluntary human shields, it should be noted 
that it is not tricky process but quite delicate one. Shannon Bosch explains that status of 
voluntary human shields is one of the recognized categories, but distinction between voluntary 
human shields and combatants cannot be considered simplified because of the reasons that in 
reality some combatants do not have authorization to participate in hostilities and, for example, 
some civilians tend to accompany the military forces.132 However, non-simplified does not 
mean impossible and unnecessary.  
 
To begin with, the Additional Protocol I defines who are combatants and it says “members of 
the armed forces of a Party to a conflict … are combatants”.133 In its turn, armed forces are 
“organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command”.134 Additionally, the 
Appels Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia defined that 
members of armed forces, who rest at home in the conflict area, still are combatants despite the 
fact that they are engaged or are not engaged in combat, or are armed.135 Alternatively, to have 
a combatant status the person should be member of organized resistance movement, volunteer 
corps or militia.136 Nevertheless, the key is that person should meet a number of requirements 
to be considered a combatant. 
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There requirements are to be under the command, and the command should bear responsibility 
for his/her subordinates; wear a sign which is fixed, distinctive, and recognizable at distance; 
carry arms openly; conduct done by the person should be in accordance with customs and laws 
of war.137 As for the voluntary human shields, they do not meet these requirements. First, they 
are not authorized members of the armed forces. Second, the shields are not legitimate 
subordinates and they are not under the responsible command. Third, the shields do not wear 
needed sign. Fourth, human shielding is in practice, but it contradicts the laws and customs of 
war. It indeed becomes crystal clear that voluntary human shields do not meet requirements of 
combatant status. Hence, the shields do not enjoy combatant status. 
 
It also should be noted that in practice the term “combatant” is usually applied in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts, but as a legal term it exists exclusively in 
international armed conflict.138 As for the forces engaged in non-international armed conflict, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross clarifies that armed forces, which belong to the 
state, can possibly be considered combatants; but when persons whose conduct can be classified 
as direct participation in hostilities are called combatants, it supposes that they cannot rely on 
protections, which are granted to civilians, but at the same time, the status of combatants is not 
applicable to them.139 Additionally, according to Robert Kolb international humanitarian law 
does not suppose the existence of combatant status in the context of non-international armed 
conflict, and hence, there are only different types of civilians who enjoy different extent of 
protection.140 Following this logic, voluntary human shields do not enjoy the status of 
combatants. However, this approach, that there are only civilians in non-international armed 
conflict, is arguable. 
 
In contrast, William Banks believes that it is wrong to believe that civilians, who take direct 
participation in hostilities, are party non-international conflict but are not combatants.141 His 
arguments are the treating non-international armed conflict as conflict between the state forces 
and regular civilians contradicts the customs associated with the law of armed conflict, and it 
does not enable application of the principle of distinction during combat.142 Alternatively, 
separately from each other two scholars Georg Nolte and Cecilie Hellestveit emphasized the 
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possibility of considering the non-state actors as combatants if their conduct constitutes 
continuous combat function.143 However, there are certain peculiarities in that context which 
are needed to be considered. 
 
According to the research conducted by Emily Crawford the continuous combat function 
supposes that participation in combat is not temporary and excludes spontaneous and sporadic 
participation.144 As for the voluntary human shields, there is no need for evidence that their 
conduct is not continuous. The key is that human shielding constitutes occasional activity. 
Additionally, the concept of the continuous combat function excludes civilians who have 
supportive functions and whose conduct cannot be considered direct participation in hostiles.145 
Hence, the activity of voluntary human shields, which theoretically can be classified as indirect 
participation in hostilities, cannot be amounted to continuous combat function. In total, 
voluntary human shields do not enjoy combatant status in non-international armed conflict. 
 
In general, it is crystal clear that in the legal context of both types of armed conflicts voluntary 
human shields ipso facto do not enjoy combatant status. Additionally, it should be noted that 
scholars have different views on the status of voluntary human shields in the context of 
combatant status. For example, Aniceé Van Engeland and Banu Bargu do not contest the reality 
that voluntary human shields do not belong to combatants.146 In contrast, Matthew V. Ezzo and 
Amos N. Guiora suggest that legal approach to the status of voluntary human shields should be 
changed. They inherently state that legal approach to the status of voluntary human shields 
should be changed and the shields should enjoy combatant status.147 Their suggestion to change 
status is arguable and have not influenced the actual status of the shields, however. It should be 
understood, that 11 years have already passed after the moment their suggestion was presented 
to the world, but the status of voluntary human shields is still the same and the causes of such 
result are clear. 
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On the one hand, this is an excellent idea to make voluntary human shields belong to combatant 
status and this is because of the following reason. Theoretically, bearing same responsibility as 
combatants do may decrease the willingness to form the shields and, thus, the appearance of 
them. In addition, it may solve the issue how the proportionality principle should be applied to 
the voluntary human shields, for example. On the other hand, there is no real need to change 
the status of voluntary human shields to the combatant status. The status of voluntary human 
shields does not remain a grey area, for example, and it is clear what happens to persons who 
formed voluntary human shields and basically took part in hostilities. Additionally, the change 
of status can possibly result in legitimizing of the use of human shields, but such consequence 
is not a desirable result in principle. 
 
2.2.2. Levée en masse status of voluntary human shields 
 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions recognize levée en masse,148 and, for example, the Geneva 
Convention III defines levee en masse as those who “spontaneously take up arms to resist the 
invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided 
they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war”.149 As for the judicial practice, 
in 2006 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia defined Bosnian 
Muslims as levée en masse, which was a group composed of fighters whose actions were 
independent and lacked the main characteristics of army,150 for example. According to Emily 
Crawford it is an example of rare incident of levée en masse recognition,151 however. 
 
There is a peculiarity in respect to the status of the levee en masse. To begin with that the levée 
are civilians in nature since the levée is formed by civilians. However, civilians, who belong to 
the levée, are not considered non-combatants.152 In addition, Nils Melzer clarifies that the 
participants of the levée are not civilians, but they also are not considered combatants since they  
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do not belong to the armed forced of the state.153 If the combatant and civilian statuses are 
mutually exceptional and person can be separately civilian or combatant,154 then the question 
“who are the levée en masse” raises. 
 
Legal scholar Emily Crawford explains that according to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
members of levée en masse are granted the status of combatant.155 Alternatively, Shannon 
Bosch believes that persons under the question have combatant status because of the reason that 
they act as combatants, and hence, distinguish themselves from the ordinary civilians.156 Dr 
Bosch also emphasizes that the combatant status is awarded to the levée right after the 
autonomous decision to resist an enemy is confirmed, and then the levée can have the status of 
the prisoner of war.157 In addition, the International Committee of the Red Cross clarifies that 
participants of the levée en masse are to carry arms, operate sporadically, and lack command, 
and hence, it cannot be classified as members of armed forces.158 In essence, the levée en masse 
is not a grey area and, roughly speaking, the levée basically is civilians who have combatant 
status. In other words, the levée en masse are not combatants sensu stricto but have combatant 
status. 
 
In order to establish whether the voluntary human shields may be considered the levée en masse, 
there is a need to find out whether the shields meet the requirements of the levée. The main 
criteria are distinctive features. William H. Boothby and Wolf Heinstschel Von Heinegg 
explain levée en masse supposes that since it is spontaneously formed, it does not have fixed, 
distinctive, and recognizable at distance sign.159 Alternatively, Emily Crawford and Alison Pert 
clarify that there is a requirement for the levée to have a distinctive sign, and in contrast, the 
main feature is spontaneous nature.160 At first sight, it may look like the voluntary human 
shields perfectly meet the requirements of the levée en masse since the shields do not have 
distinctive signs and are formed spontaneously.  
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Nevertheless, the question whether the levée really does not have a distinctive sign is arguable. 
For example, Stefan Kirchner believes that the levée actually has the distinctive sign, and this 
sign is openly carrying arms.161 Kirchner’s argument is the Geneva Convention III requires to 
carry arms openly162 for purpose of distinguishing.163 As for the voluntary human shields in the 
context of “openly carrying arms”, it should be noted that the shields are not tend to carry arms 
in principle. The key is that the shielding supposes, for example, preventing attack using their 
bodies as shields, but not by application of weapons. It may be metaphorically stated that the 
shields are weapons. If so, the weapons hold weapons. This is nonsense, however. 
Consequently, the voluntary human shields do not meet the requirement of openly carrying 
arms. 
 
On one hand, it is clear the voluntary human shields have a lot in common with the levée en 
masse. For example, both of them are formed voluntarily, their members are not ordinary 
combatants, both of them are engaged in combat, their activity may be considered direct 
participation in hostilities, and so on. On another hand, the voluntary human shields and the 
levée en masse are not the same. The main reason of it is that the human shields do not meet 
the requirements of the levée. Consequently, the shields and the levée are two different 
categories, and even though, the shields have similarities with the levée, the shields do not enjoy 
the combatant status of the levée. 
 
2.2.3. Persons accompanying armed forces and status of voluntary human shields 
 
At first sight, it is possible to suppose that the voluntary human shields can be considered 
“persons accompanying armed forces” because of the reason that voluntary shields are engaged 
in combat in order to support the armed forces of the party to the conflict and basically are side 
by side with combatants, for example. In order to discover whether the voluntary human shields 
fall under the category of persons who accompany the armed forces, there is a primary need to 
establish who are these persons under the question and what are their distinctive features, and 
thus, what are requirements of the category of persons accompanying armed forces. 
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To begin with, persons who accompany the armed forces are a special category under 
international law. According to Knut Ipsen they are not members of armed forces and they are 
civilians by default.164 Additionally, the legal expert highlights that in special circumstances 
civilians may gain the status of combatants, and these circumstances are that civilians under the 
question are considered resistance forces or the levée en masse.165 The persons accompanying 
the armed forces do not represent the above-mentioned circumstances, however. They are 
civilians who have civilian status, and this is not a subject to large criticism. 
 
There also is a peculiarity in respect to the status. It is significant to note that status of the 
prisoner of war is also granted to the persons accompanying armed forces by international 
instruments. For example, the Geneva Convention III explicitly says “prisoners of war … 
[include] persons who accompany the armed forces”,166 and the Annex to the Hague 
Convention IV states “individuals who follow the army without directly belonging to it … are 
entailed to be treated as prisoners of war”.167 It should be noted that this approach gained wide 
support from the doctrinal studies.  
 
For example, according to Giulio Bartolini the persons accompanying armed forces may enjoy 
the prisoners of war status,168 and Ben Saul explains it is so because of the strong correlation 
between the armed forces and the persons who are attached to the forces.169 In addition, legal 
expert W. Hays Parks stated that there is no practice showing that persons accompanying armed 
forces may not enjoy the status of prisoner of war and were denied the mentioned status.170 In 
respect to all the above stated the following should be concluded. The persons, who accompany 
the armed forces, are civilians, who have civilian status, but in case of detention they may 
possibly have the prisoners of war status. 
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Alternatively, the Geneva Convention III considers the persons accompanying the armed forces 
as “civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, 
members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces”.171 These 
categories of persons may theoretically form voluntary human shields. However, the common 
approach to the shields supposes that the shielding is conducted by the average civilians, who 
spontaneously decide to form the shield and whose link with armed forces is occasional 
shielding and, hence, who do not have a strong link with the armed forces. As a matter of fact, 
the voluntary human shields do not really fall under the categories of persons defined by the 
Geneva Convention III. 
 
Additionally, the Geneva Convention III defines that persons, who accompany the armed 
forces, should have authorization to accompany and this authorization should be supported by 
the document, which is the identity card.172 As for the voluntary human shields, they may not 
receive authorization for the shielding, and this defined in the Geneva Convention IV and the 
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.173 As for the identity cards, the 
statement that the shields have them would probably receive large criticism, and this is justified. 
This is because of the reason that in contrast to the persons accompanying the armed forces, the 
voluntary human shields do not have the identity card likewise the persons accompanying the 
armed forces do. 
 
Among other things, it will not be correct to omit the fact that the persons accompanying the 
armed forces and the voluntary human shields have a number of similarities. For example, 
Shannon Bosch defined that both persons accompanying the armed forces and the voluntary 
human shields do not carry arms, do not have permission to directly participate in hostilities, 
and do not wear special uniform, and the conduct of both of them may be possibly counted as 
the same kind of assistance.174 Nevertheless, the legal expert clarifies that the key is identity 
cards, and the voluntary human shields do not obtain them and, thus, are not amounted to the 
category of the persons accompanying the armed forces.175 In total, it shows that despite the 
fact that voluntary human shields and the persons accompanying armed forces have common 
features, the shields are not considered the persons accompanying armed forces.  
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2.2.4. Civilian status of voluntary human shields 
 
All the above provided analyses enable to suppose that the voluntary human shields have 
civilian status. To begin with, that the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
negatively defines who are civilians and, in principle, civilians can be positively defined as 
those who are not combatants.176 The category of civilians is quite broad one, and this can be 
explained by the fact that this category includes as civilians who are not guaranteed the right to 
take part in hostilities as civilians who are guaranteed to participate in hostilities and to have 
the status of the prisoners of war.  
 
Because of the reason that provided above analyses have shown that the voluntary human 
shields cannot be considered the levée en masse and the persons who accompany the armed 
forces, here the voluntary human shields are viewed thought the prism of civilians who do not 
have official authorization to take part in hostilities. The negative definition of civilians, which 
is provided in the Additional Protocol I, enables to determine key characteristics of the civilians. 
The Protocol I explicitly says that “civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the 
categories of persons referred to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and 
in Article 43 of this Protocol”,177 the verification – whether the voluntary human shields fall 
under the meaning of the mentioned exclusions – enables to establish whether the shields are 
or are not civilians.  
 
The section 1 of the Article 43 mentions organized armed forces, groups which are under the 
responsible command, which are subject to the internal system of discipline.178 As for the 
voluntary human shields, it should be understood the following. Even though their members 
act as organized persons, this does not suppose that the shields are organized forces and the key 
is that the shielding happens occasionally. In addition, members of the human shields are people 
who do not belong to the organization with internal disciplinary system. Consequently, there 
can be no talk about the internal disciplinary system of the human shields. One more mentioned 
feature is being under the responsible command. Even though the shield may be commanded, 
the shield is not the kind of organization where the superior and the subordinates are. Hence, in 
the context of the voluntary human shields there is no responsible command. 
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The section 2 of the Article 43 explicitly mention “members of the armed forces of a Party to a 
conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains …)”,179 and this means that these persons 
are excluded from the meaning of the civilians. To begin with the most simple and obvious. 
Being a member of the armed forces supposes that the member should have and wear a special 
defined uniform. As a rule, civilian as members of the voluntary human shields do not wear the 
uniform. The second feature is that members of armed forces have authorization from the state, 
for example, and this authorization is a prove that specific person is a member of armed forces. 
The voluntary human shields do not have such authorization. Altogether, human shields are not 
that members of the armed forces, which are mentioned in the Article 43.2 of the Additional 
Protocol I. 
 
After the above analysis it is acceptable to move to the article of the Geneva Convention III the 
Additional Protocol I makes reference to. The section 1 of the Article 4.A says “members of 
the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps 
forming part of such armed forces”.180 To be with, the voluntary human shields satisfy only one 
requirement, and this is the word “volunteer”. As for another criteria, the human shields are 
totally different. The analysis above made it crystal clear that human shields cannot be 
considered the members of armed forces. The militias as well as volunteer corps, which form 
the part of the armed forces, suppose internal discipline and responsible command. As it was 
already shown, the internal discipline and responsible command are not applicable to the 
voluntary human shields. 
 
The section 2 of the Article 4.A says about militias and organized resistance movements,181 
which meet the criteria of being under the responsible command, having fixed distinctive and 
recognizable at distance sign, carrying arms openly, act in respect to the laws and customs of 
war.182 Since these criteria are definable, it is proper to directly define whether the voluntary 
human shields meet them. Civilians as human shields are not subordinates belonging to the 
armed forces and, hence, there is no commander responsible for their conduct as conduct of his 
subordinates. As for the sign, civilians as human shields do not have such sign as the armed 
forces or medical personnel have, for example. As for the carrying arms openly, the human 
shields do not carry weapon in principle. As for the laws and customs of law, the human 
shielding contradicts them and, hence, the conduct of the voluntary human shields cannot be 
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considered as activity done according to the laws and customs of war. Basically, the voluntary 
human shields are not these persons, which are mentioned in the Article 4.A(2) of the Geneva 
Convention III. 
 
The section 3 of the Article 4.A refers to the “members of regular armed forces who profess 
allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power”.183 The key 
wording is “members of regular armed forces”. As it was already and repeatedly shown, the 
voluntary human shields are not members of the armed forces at all. Hence, the human shields 
are not these people which are defined by the mentioned article. Alternatively, the last article, 
which should be analyzed, is the Article 4.A(6). It says “inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, 
who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, 
without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms 
openly and respect the laws and customs of war”.184 The key is that voluntary human shields 
do not carry arms, do not act with respect to the laws and customs of war, and do not act to 
resist, but they act to shield, first of all. Consequently, the voluntary human shields do not meet 
requirements, which are set in the Article 4.A(6) of the Geneva Convention III. 
 
The analysis made it clear and substantiated that the voluntary human shields have civilian 
status. Also, it should be mentioned that opinions on the civilian status of voluntary human 
shields are divided, however. For example, Marco Sassòli believes that treating voluntary 
human shields as civilians is self-defeating.185 On another hand, Yoram Dinstein believes that 
voluntary human shields loose original civilian status.186 However, such believes turn the status 
of the voluntary human shields into the grey area and basically make the shields status-less, 
what is not expectable. Alternatively, the legal experts and scholars still show a large support 
to the idea that voluntary human shields have civilian status,187 and Josiane Haas, for example, 
believes that voluntary human shields retain civilian status even when they directly participate 
in hostilities.188 In total, all the above-mentioned showed that civilian status of voluntary human 
shields is justified despite the existing contrary believes.  
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3. PROTECTION PRESCRIBED TO HUMAN SHIELDS 
 
Protection is always a complex issue, and the protection of the human shields is not an 
exception. The key is that protection in the context of human shields is not limited to the couple 
provision on prohibition to do something. When it is legal protection of the human shields, it 
relates general provisions on protection, provisions on deterring from doing something, 
provisions on obligations to do something, provisions on liability, and several sharp issues 
which pose challenges to the protection. Considering the complexity of the protection question 
and the peculiarities of the human shields, this chapter focuses on the protection of human 
shields and the perspectives of legal developments in respect to the protection. First, it analyses 
the protection of human shields with special respect to their nature. Second, it discovers the 
obligations of the parties to the conflict in the context of the human shields protection. At last, 
this chapter analyses the questions which challenge the protection of human shields. 
 
3.1. Protection of human shields depending on their nature 
 
The constant analysis of human shields shows that the nature of human shields plays one of the 
key roles in the whole system of human shields concept. In other words, both involuntariness 
and voluntariness of human shields influence several issues, and the protection may possibly 
be not an exception. Considering the importance of the fact that shields may be formed 
voluntary or voluntary, this sub-chapter discovers the protection of human shields, which are 
formed under the pressure and constitute involuntary human shields, at first. Then, it finds out 
the protection which is prescribed to the human shields which are formed voluntarily by 
civilians. 
 
3.1.1. Protection of involuntary human shields 
 
The protection of the involuntary human shields is probably one of the clearest issues in the 
concept of human shields in general. The above provided analysis showed that the conduct of 
involuntary human shields is not amounted as direct participation in hostilities, participants 
retain their original status and there is no loose of status. Hence, there is no actual ground to 
argue on the protection issues. This supposes that participants of the involuntary human shields 
should enjoy the general protections which are prescribed to their status. For example, civilians 
used as involuntary human shields should have the full range of protections prescribed to their 
civilian status. 
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The very first protection in relation to the civilians as human shields is prohibition to resort to 
the usage of human shields, which is set in the Additional Protocol I,189 for example. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross adds that this prohibition is also a custom in 
international humanitarian law.190 Nevertheless, it should be noted, as Marco Sassòli believes, 
the prohibition to use civilians as shields is applicable only to the civilian persons, and it does 
not apply to the civilian objects.191 Alternatively, it should be noted that the customary rule on 
prohibition against using the human shields is applicable in both types of armed conflict – 
international and non-international,192 and is not a precautionary measure, which is passive.193 
In general, this shows that even in non-international armed conflict, where the application of 
international humanitarian law is a sharp question, the human shields remain protected in some 
extent. 
 
Another protection in the context of civilians is that human shields may not be considered 
combatants. Hence, in case of doubt whether it is conduct of combatants or civilians, the 
members of the shields should be considered as civilians. This rule is set in the Additional 
Protocol I194 too. All that references to the principle of distinction. The International Committee 
of the Red Cross defines this principle as a norm of customary law and which should be 
applicable in both types of conflict.195 Alternatively, Marco Alberto Velásquez-Ruiz describes 
the principle of distinction as this which should be understood as explicit prohibition of attack 
directed against civilians, and violation is a war crime.196 The same prohibition of attack against 
civilians was also emphasized by the International Court of Justice.197 Consequently, all the 
above mentioned defines that involuntary human shields should be not be directly attacked.  
 
One more thing, which relates to the issue of distinction but more to the distinction in general, 
is that distinction should also be necessarily made in relation to the nature of human shields – 
whether the shielding is voluntary or involuntary. The key is that protection framework of 
voluntary human shields and involuntary human shields differs, and thus results in different 
kind and extent of protection. As of today, the search on question – how to determine the nature 
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of human shields – does not bring fruits. Moreover, it is also believed that during the course of 
hostilities differentiation is not possible to be done.198 Consequently, the question – how to 
make distinction between the human shields easy and efficient – is separate one and deserves a 
separate research with future proposal.  
 
Another protection, which should work in the benefit of civilians forming involuntary human 
shields, is the principle of proportionality. Ian Henderson and Kate Reece clarify that the 
principle is to prevent attack against civilian persons and objects.199 Alternatively, in the 
Kupreskic case the court noted that even if it is incidental attack against civilians, this attack 
should still be in accordance with the principle of proportionality.200 It also should be noted that 
the test of proportionality is set in the Additional Protocol I.201 Even though the principle is 
officially recognized and set in international instrument, the principle of proportionality is still 
a sharp question. For example, Yoram Dinstein believes that test of proportionality should be 
“relaxed” in the context of civilians as human shields.202 In contrast, Marco Sassòli states that 
it is unclear how the test on proportionality should be made in respect to the involuntary human 
shields, but these shields should not have less weight than any other civilians.203 In total, it is 
possible to see that the principle of proportionality should work in the benefit of protection of 
human shields, but the principle has certain peculiarities and uncertainties.  
 
One more detail in relation to the protection of involuntary human shields is the following. 
Participants of involuntary human shields are forced to shield and because of that reason they 
act contrary to the laws and customs of war. The members of the involuntary human shields are 
basically victims and, consequently, they may not be responsible for the shielding. The 
members may apply to the court for justice and because they were used as shields. For example, 
in the Demiray case the claim was made by the wife of victim, and she stated that her husband 
was used as a shield.204 As for those, who force people to form human shields and actually use  
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human shields, they bear criminal responsibility. They may be responsible at the International 
Criminal Court, for example, or at national courts, and the responsibility will be for the 
committing a war crime. 
 
All the above mentioned enables to make a conclusion that participants of involuntary human 
shields have extent of protections. These protections are based on their status, and the direct 
participation in hostilities does not influence neither status nor protections under the status. 
These protections basically represent the rule of customary law, which is set in the international 
instruments and which prohibits the usage of human shields. These protections are also 
represented by the principles of international humanitarian law, which are principles of 
distinction and proportionality. Theoretically, these both principles should work in favor of 
human shields, but the application of them is a subject to discussion in scientific circles. 
However, the discussion does not and should not preclude the application. Hence, looking at 
all the above mentioned, it is possible to conclude that involuntary human shields have 
protection framework and this framework is quite good but has some peculiarities. 
 
3.1.2. Protection of voluntary human shields 
 
The protection of the voluntary human shield is complex issue, and there are several 
approaches. The first approach is that voluntary human shields lose their civilian protection in 
time of shielding. Shannon Bosch suggests that civilians as human shields lose the protection, 
which is prescribed to the civilian status, and this is because of direct participation in 
hostilities.205 It is understandable that such attitude is influenced by the Additional Protocols to 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which explicitly state that civilians do not have legal protection 
from attack if they take direct part in hostilities.206 This approach has peculiarity, however. 
 
For example, Dapo Akande states that the provision, with enables to attack the civilians who 
directly participate in hostilities,207 is difficult to apply in practice. According to him, it is not 
easy because even the concept of the direct participation in hostilities is not enough clear.208 In  
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total, according to the first approach, there can be no talk about civilian protection at all. Hence, 
voluntary human shields may not rely on such civilian protections as the involuntary human 
shields have. 
 
The second approach does not agree that kind of participation does not play a role in the context 
of the protection of the voluntary human shields. According to the approach, there are still 
situations, where voluntary human shields may immune from attack, and this is because of the 
reason that voluntary human shields may practically participate in hostilities in both ways – 
directly and indirectly. For example, according to the research conducted by Marco Sassòli the 
voluntary human shields may take direct participation in hostilities only when the shield is 
really harming.209 However, this does not exclude the indirect participation in hostilities. 
 
Additionally, Michael L. Gross gives particle examples in support of this approach. Gross states 
that voluntary human shields may immune from attack when their conduct is indirect 
participation in hostilities and is, for example, “shielding military HQ or supply depot, 
protecting retreating troops, political wing activities”.210 Alternatively, according to Michael L. 
Gross the voluntary human shields do not immune from attack in time of such direct 
participation in hostilities as “shielding a primed missile launcher, protecting attacking 
troops”.211 It should be noted that the above provided division on the direct and indirect 
participation in hostilities results in loosing or retaining protection from the direct attack.  
 
The third approach is that voluntary human shields do not lose protection prescribed to their 
status. Nils Melzer stated that conduct of the voluntary human shields remains indirect.212 The 
legal adviser also explains that the conduct of the voluntary human shields still does not result 
in losing the civilian protection, the attacker is responsible for the attack directed against the 
shields, but the death of voluntary human shields may be considered a subject to incidental 
deaths.213 Along with Nils Melzer, Shannon Bosch has one more suggestion and highlights that 
despite the participation and aspiration, the voluntary human should not be considered a 
legitimate target.214  
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Bosch provides an example with children used as human shields, and she states that children 
never lose protection prescribed by law.215 It is also important to note that according to the 
scholar, the retention of the status of the voluntary human shields supposes that attack against 
them may be done with relaxed calculation of collateral damage than it actually is with average 
civilians, who do not form human shields but are located close to the military objectives.216 In 
general, it shows that the third approach is to be about the relaxing the tests applicable to the 
situations with attack against the human shields. 
 
Alternatively, none of the mentioned approaches does not preclude liability. The sub-chapter 
1.1. of this work has shown and made it crystal clear that resorting to the use of human shields 
is prohibited method of warfare under international humanitarian law and is a war crime under 
the international criminal law. Hence, the members of the armed forces of party to the conflict, 
who resorted to the usage of the voluntary human shields, are responsible for the violation of 
the laws and customs of war and committing a war crime. These people may bear criminal 
responsibility and be convicted under international criminal law at the International Criminal 
Court, for example. The International Criminal Court is not the only one possible institution 
where combatants may be convicted for the committing a war crime, however. They may also 
be convicted at national tribunals, for example. 
 
When it is voluntary human shields, it is not only about the responsibility of the combatants. In 
contrast to the involuntary human shields, the voluntary human shields do not have immunity 
from prosecution. The key is that involuntary human shields are shielding because they are 
forced to do so while voluntary human shields are shielding on the base of their personal will. 
It is important to understand that voluntary human shields are not legitimate combatants and, 
thus, they are not responsible for the conduct at the same extent as combatants usually do. Also, 
participants of voluntary human shields may not be responsible at the International Criminal 
Court, for example.  
 
The thing is that war crime of human shielding under the Rome Statute supposes the usage of 
human shields by belligerents, but it does not suppose the liability for the voluntary forming of 
the human shields by civilians. Such conclusion is analytically made on the base of the 
provision on prohibition to use human shields, which is “utilizing the presence of a civilian or 
other protected person to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military 
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operations”.217 In addition, it should be emphasized that members of voluntary human shields 
are responsible for their conduct under the national laws. Hence, it depends on the domestic 
legislation the extent of liability which voluntary human shields have. 
 
All the above mentioned showed that protection of the voluntary human shields is a sharp 
question. The common approach is that voluntary human shields are to lose protections which 
are prescribed to their original status, and this is understandable. The direct participation in 
hostilities influences the issue of protection, but the voluntariness of the human shields also 
does not play the last role. Moreover, these participation and aspiration result in the fact that 
even protections, which are prescribed to the voluntary human shields, do not preclude the 
liability for the shielding. The liability may be considered justified, however. This is because 
of the reason that in fact, voluntary human shields commit a crime themselves while involuntary 
human shields are result of crime committed by the belligerent. 
 
3.2. Obligations of belligerents in regard to human shields protection 
 
It is important to understand that protection is not limited to the rule prohibiting the use of 
human shields. Prohibition should also entail other connected issues. It is understandable that 
parties to the conflict should bear certain responsibilities in respect to the human shields’ 
protection apart from the obligation to not resort to the usage of any kind of human shields. 
This sub-chapter is to establish what obligations parties to the conflict have in respect to the 
human shields’ protection. First, it discovers what obligations are had by defender. Second, it 
finds out what obligations are had by attacker. 
   
3.2.1. Obligations of the belligerent using human shields 
 
To begin with, the collocation ‘belligerent using human shields’, which is used in the headline, 
is to mark a party to the conflict who plays a role of defender in the armed conflict. It is also 
important to highlight that it does not matter who are party to the conflict – defender or attacker 
– and it is not allowed to resort to the use of human shields in any case. Hence, the very first 
obligation of the defender in respect to the civilians as human shields is deterring from the use 
of human shields. This obligation reflects the customary international humanitarian law.218 It is  
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also set the Geneva Convention IV and the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.219 Considering the wording of both documents in respect to the human shields, 
the following should be mentioned. 
 
The wording of both documents addresses the human shields as those, who are involuntary, but 
the spirit of the documents has a slightly different approach to the shields. The spirit suggests 
that documents contain the prohibition to use both types of human shields – voluntary and 
involuntary. If it was not in that way, the voluntary human shields would remain a somewhat 
of gray area in the context of modern humanitarian law or they were addressed separately in 
the instruments on the humanitarian law. Consequently, the defender has an obligation to refrain 
from the use of both voluntary and involuntary human shields. 
 
The above-mentioned obligation is not the only one, however. The defender should refrain from 
the pretending civilians by the means of dressing combatants in civilian clothes. René Värk 
provides with practical example when this obligation was violated, and this example is that 
forces of the Fedayeen Saddam worn civilian clothes and plus used human shields.220 When 
combatants dress in civilian clothes, it is a perfidy. The prohibition of perfidy is a norm of 
customary law221 and is set in the Protocol Additional I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.222 
The Protocol defines perfidy as “acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to 
believe that he is entitled to, or obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international 
law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray this confidence”,223 and this perfectly 
reflects the situation when combatants dress civilian clothes in order to confuse the enemy. 
 
Additionally, when combatants dress in civilian clothes, they challenge the application of the 
principle of distinction between the combatants and civilians. This principle is set in the both 
Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.224 Gabriel Swiney explains the principle 
of distinction suggests that persons, who do not belong to armed forces, may not be a subject 
of attack.225 When combatants dress in civilian clothes, they do not have a fixed distinctive 
sign, which should be had by combatants in order to distinguish them from civilians and other  
 
219 Geneva Convention IV, Art. 28; Additional Protocol I, Art. 51.7 
220 R. Värk. The Status and Protection of Unlawful Combatants. – Juridica International 2005/X, p. 193 
221 Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck (eds). Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 3, p. 221 
222 Additional Protocol I, Art. 37.1(c) 
223 Ibid., Art. 37.1 
224 Ibid., Art. 48, 51.2, 52.2; Additional Protocol II, Art. 13.2 
225 G. Swiney. The Principle of Distinction and the Realities of Modern War. – The International Lawyer 
2005/39 (3), p. 734 
 51 
persons. Hence, in the course of hostilities it obviously is difficult to establish the truth – 
whether it is forced civilians or actual combatants – and therefore the application of the 
principle is challenged.  
In order to follow and simplify the application of the above-mentioned principle, the defender 
may change the location of civilians. Such change supposes legitimate evacuation, but not 
forced deportation of persons in order to change the population of certain area. The Geneva 
Convention IV provides that “total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the 
population or imperative military reasons so demand”.226 However, Michael N. Schmitt 
explains that there is a peculiarity. According to him, when belligerent evacuates people in 
order to shield forces from attack in the time of changing location, then it is a violation of law.227 
And this is understandable, because than it basically is a usage of human shields. 
The concept of human shielding intersects with the concept of hostage-taking. The provision 
on prohibition to take hostages is contained the 1949 Geneva Conventions228 and the Additional 
Protocol II.229 Additionally, The International Committee of the Red Cross defines hostages as 
people who in/voluntary are in power of belligerent and answer with freedom/physical 
integrity/life “for the execution of orders given by those in whose hands they have fallen, or for 
any hostile acts committed against them”.230 As for the human shields in the context of hostages, 
Michael N. Shmitt explains that persons who are seized and then forced to shield are considered 
hostages.231 Hence, defender has an obligation to deter from taking hostages, which in its turn, 
prevents the usage of human shields. 
One more obligation of the defender relates to the presence of militias nearby the civilians and 
civilian objects. The Additional Protocol I defines that belligerents should “avoid locating 
military objectives within or near densely populated areas”,232 and this is considered to be the 
norm of customary law.233 When the belligerent follows this rule, it prevents the possibility of  
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appearance of the voluntary human shields and simplifies the application of the principles of 
international humanitarian law, for example. Hence, the defender has an obligation to take 
necessary steps to prevent the location of military objectives close to the civilian inhabitants. 
Alternatively, the duties of the defender may be conditionally divided into the negative and 
positive obligations. Among the negative obligations, Vera Rusinova defines deterring from 
moving civilian persons to gain military advantage and/or to shield military object and 
operations, and from placing military objectives close to the civilian objects.234 As for the 
positive obligations, Rusinova defines removing civilians from the places of military 
objectives, refraining from locating military objectives near places where civilians are located, 
to defend civilians from dangers which may be result of military operations.235 Division on the 
types enables to see the whole spectrum of the obligations of the defender in respect to the 
civilians as human shields. 
3.2.2. Obligations of the belligerent attacking human shields 
 
To begin with, the collocation ‘belligerent attacking human shields’, which is used in the 
headline, is to mark a party to the conflict who plays a role of attacker in the armed conflict. As 
it was mentioned before, when it is context of the human shields, it does not matter – whether 
the party to the conflict is defender or attacker – and both parties to the conflict should refrain 
from the use of human shields. Thus, the attacker also has an obligation to not use human 
shields. In the context of civilians this obligation is set in the Geneva Convention IV236 and the 
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.237 Also, according to the research of 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, this obligation reflects customary law.238 
However, it is important to note that attacker’s obligations in relation to human shields is not 
limited to the prohibition to use the shields.  
 
Attacker is that party to the armed conflict, that may possibly face the usage of human shields 
by enemy and indeed has certain obligations regarding this matter. The very first obligation is 
the following the principle of distinction. The sense of this principle is that attacker’s forces 
should refrain from the directing attack against civilians but only combatants may be targeted. 
This principle is established in the both Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva 
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Conventions,239 and according to the International Committee of the Red Cross the rule reflects 
customary law.240 However, it should be understood that human shields are special 
circumstance in the hostilities and the military operation may possibly be cancelled because of 
the presence of human shields, but there are certain legal peculiarities which can enable attack 
on the area with human shields. 
 
Hence, another principle, which should be followed by the attacker, is the principle of 
proportionality. It is set twice in the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.241 
Also, the assessment of the International Committee of the Red Cross showed that this principle 
is a norm of customary law.242 To make it clear, the principle supposes that civilian losses may 
not exceed the value of the military objective. This ‘value’ is not about price but it is about 
necessity. Additionally, in the Targeted Killing case the court also called upon the application 
of the proportionality principle in relation to the civilians taking direct part in hostilities,243 
which can be considered human shields, for example.  
 
The court highlighted the necessity to use means, which do not cause necessary damages, 
regarding the civilians directly participating in hostilities.244 This suggests that the type and 
method of warfare as well as degree of force are the matter of question. According to the 
research of Nils Melzer, belligerent should act in the manner which does not put civilians in 
unnecessary risks, and it should not use lethal force when no need exists.245 Additionally, 
Michel N. Schmitt provides with practical example how it can be made. This example is if 
human shields are at facility which produces electric energy, the first thing done by the attacker 
should be cutting electricity to the facility and only after to start fully-functioning military 
operation.246 It should be understood that cutting electricity would deter the shields from the 
harm and damage, which could be caused by the electrical energy. 
 
Alternatively, Michel N. Schmitt states that human shields should be counted as civilians whose 
presence is just a coincident, or in other words, is incidental.247 The legal expert explains that, 
therefore, the deaths of and injuries to the participants of human shields are to be considered 
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incidental, and it is in accordance with the Additional Protocol I.248 This statement on counting 
the human shields as incidental losses is arguable, however. This is because of the reason it, 
ipso facto, enables to ignore the presence of civilians on the battlefield, but ignoring the civilian 
presence is contrary to the basics of protections prescribed to the persons who have civilian 
status. 
 
In general, obligations of the attacker in respect to the human shields are basically situated on 
the precautionary measures. The legal expert Marco Sassòli highlights that specifically attacker 
has primary responsibility for the taking all measures which are precautionary, and both state 
practice and the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions are in a line with this 
believe.249 As for the precautions, they may be viewed as positive and negative obligations. 
Marco Sassòli, for example, believes that passive precautions are not strong, and it is disputable 
whether they have customary character since they are not a subject of frequent taking.250 
However, such precautions still exist despite criticism. 
 
Passive precautions are about the effects of attacks and are set in the Additional Protocol I251 
as it was mentioned before. According to the Protocol, there are three negative obligations, 
which suggest removing civilians from areas where military objectives are situated, avoid 
placing the facilities having military value close to the places of civilian behavior, taking 
precautions in order to deter civilian people and objects from damages resulting from the 
conducting military operations.252 According to Marco Sassòli, when specifically attacker does 
not take these passive precautionary measures, it constitutes the grave breaches under the 
Protocol, where precaution are specified, and it also constitutes a war crime under the Rome 
Statute.253 In total, it emphasizes the actual need and obligation to take passive precautionary 
measures. 
 
However, the precautions are not limited to passive only. Precautions also are ‘active’ and may 
possibly be considered positive obligations of attacker. They are set in the Additional Protocol 
I too. According to the Protocol, these obligations are ensuring avoiding the attack against 
civilians, refraining from causing unnecessary harm and damage, cancelling/suspension of 
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attack to prevent attacking civilian people and objects, making warnings in advance.254 This list 
is not exhaustive, and there are two more positive obligations. They are choosing to attack the 
military objective which will result in less extent of civilian losses if the choice is available, 
and the belligerents should avoid causing losses of and damages to civilian objects during 
hostilities at sea.255 In total, it shows that attacker has a number of obligations, which are not 
limited to the prohibition to use human shields. 
 
3.3. Challenges to protection of human shields 
 
The concept of human shields is not a simple one in principle, and the protection of human 
shields as a part of this concept is not simplified too. The thing is that system of protection of 
human shields may be considered developed, but there are still some issues which remain 
uncertain, are not in favor of human shields, and may be a source of confusions. This sub-
chapter is to analyze the challenges to the protection of human shields. First, it analyses the 
dilemma of the principle of proportionality. Second, it refers to the basics of the protection of 
human shields in the context of non-international armed conflict and analyses the problems 
which appear in respect to the human shields protection in the mentioned kind of armed conflict. 
 
3.3.1. Dilemma of proportionality principle 
 
The principle of proportionality is set in the Additional Protocol I256 and is believed to be a 
norm of customary law.257 It was already mentioned multiple times that following the principle 
of proportionality amounts to the obligations of belligerents. However, there is a peculiarity 
regarding the human shields in the context of principle of proportionality. This peculiarity is 
that there is not only one officially recognized, established and accepted approach to the place 
of human shields in the test on proportionality. The thing is that believes about the role of 
human shields vary. Basically, there are thee approaches the legal experts argue about. 
 
The first approach supposes that principle of proportionality is applicable to the human shields 
and human shields has the same weight as any other civilians. According to this approach, both 
types of human shields – voluntary and involuntary – are subject of counting in proportionality  
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test. To begin with, Michael Newton and Larry May state that principle is applicable to the 
human shields because of the reason that participants of human shields are civilians.258 
However, there is not the only one argument which they made. 
 
As for voluntary human shields, Michael Newton and Larry May explain that their participants 
do not wave their right to life during shielding, they could possibly be manipulated by the state 
and political parties.259 As for involuntary human shields, scholars believe that this kind of 
human shields are subject to the principle of proportionality and have full weight in counting, 
because involuntary human shields retain their civilian immunity and do not act willing fully.260 
However, there is one detail which deserves to be mentioned. 
 
It is important to note, the above-mentioned approach does not totally preclude the attack. In 
other words, principle of proportionality is applicable to all kinds of human shields, but there 
is no group of persons, which supposes that test on proportionality should always be in favor 
of them. For example, Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen explains that children as human shields are 
not considered legitimate targets but attacking the place shielded by them is legitimate, and the 
principle of proportionality should be applied.261 Consequently, it is possible to see that the first 
approach supposes the application of principle of proportionality to both voluntary and 
involuntary human shields, but it also precludes the usage of status of human shields for the 
personal benefit of members of human shields. 
 
The second approach is about the following. The human shields should not be a subject of the 
principle of proportionality. Ian Henderson and Patrick Keane explain that proportionality is 
not applicable to human shields because of the reason that their members take direct part in 
hostilities.262 However, experts do not show support to this approach. According to them, such 
approach enables some civilians to take advantage of civilian status for voluntary being present 
at military objective, and other civilians as human shields loose the advantages.263 To be more  
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specific, civilian working at the military munition factory is not a subject to the loss of 
protection while the shields loose.264 However, the above-mentioned scholars, Ian Henderson 
and Patrick Keane, are not the only persons, who find civilians to suffer from this approach. 
 
Banu Bargu had a research on such approach and according to the results, the approach makes 
the civilians, who form human shields, vulnerable if to compare with other civilians.265 
Additionally, Michael N. Schmitt states that such approach is to prevent gaining benefits by the 
members of human shields.266 In essence, this approach should discourage civilians from 
forming human shields, and it actually simplifies the calculations applicable to the 
proportionality test since in this approach human shields are the factor which is allowed to be 
ignored. 
 
The third approach supposes that principle of proportionality is applicable to the human shields 
and they do not loose protections, but their role in proportionality test is discounted. According 
to the research conducted by Ian Henderson and Patrick Keane, the involuntary human shields 
are supposed to be equally treated with the voluntary human shields under this approach.267 
This is because of the reason, that law does not suppose that life of different categories and 
types of people may have different value.268 This approach is not limited to the above provided 
argument, however. 
 
Alternatively, Michael N. Schmitt believes that this approach also does not contradict the 
Article of 51(8) of the Additional Protocol I, which states that belligerent, who bumped into the 
human shields, should be still bound by the norms on protections prescribed to civilians.269 
Moreover, the legal expert believes this approach facilitates the concept that human shields 
should be considered civilians and the application of proportionality principle to them.270 
However, this approach is also a subject to criticism. Marco Sassòli is one of those who does 
not agree. The scholar directly states that human shields should not have less value then other 
civilians,271 for example. 
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The author of this study believes that voluntary human shields should lose their protection from 
the attack, which comes from the principle of proportionality. The key is that according to the 
Additional Protocol I the civilians taking part in hostilities lose the protection from the dangers 
of attack,272 and the voluntary human shields are civilians who take direct part in hostilities. 
Consequently, it is a logical outcome coming from the provision of the Protocol I when the 
human shields stop having protection from attack. 
 
3.3.2. Protection of human shields under non-international armed conflict 
 
The question how to make the armed non-state actors follow the humanitarian law is quite 
sharp. To begin with, the Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which is a 
document specifically designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities in non-international armed 
conflict, does not have an explicit prohibition to use human shields as the Additional Protocol 
I does, for example. However, there is a provision in the Protocol II, which can be possibly 
used as somewhat of ambarella close in relation to the human shields. This provision says that 
civilians should be protected from the dangers of war and may not be directly targeted.273 Since 
it is not an explicit prohibition, it does not look self-evident in respect to human shields. Hence, 
the question – whether armed non-state actors are bound under the international humanitarian 
law regulations – raises. 
 
Legal expert William T. Worster believes that the actors may have obligations under the 
instruments of intentional humanitarian law.274 Alternatively, Sandesh Sivakumaran explains 
that obligations of the actors in relation to the laws governing the armed conflict do not come 
from international instruments, but they come from customary character of the provisions set 
in the instruments.275 However, in this context it is reasonable to note that not all provisions of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions reflect customary law. As for the prohibition to use human 
shields, the International Committee of the Red Cross considers it as a rule of customary law.276 
Consequently, if the armed non-state actors are bound by customary law, they are bound by 
prohibition to use particularly human shields. 
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Another approach supposes that armed non-state actors may be bound international law if they 
decide to do so. Michelle Mack states that actors may show their desire and decision to follow 
the regulations by making the unilateral declaration.277 According to the researches made by 
Sandesh Sivakumaran, they were made by Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the National Liberation 
Army of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Kosovo Liberation Army, and Sudan 
Liberation Movement-Unity,278 for example. As for judicial practice, the courts show support 
to this idea of unilateral declarations. it was emphasized that the declaration was made in the 
Akayesu case,279 for example. Additionally, in the Israeli Wall case the such declaration was 
considered valid by the International Court of Justice.280 Such ad hoc declarations are widely 
accepted practice, in fact. Hence, the following becomes crystal clear. If the armed non-state 
actors make a unilateral declaration, they may become obliged under the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and, thus, have obligation to not use human shields. 
 
In addition to all the above-mentioned, there is one more approach. According to it, the armed 
non-states actors may become obliged under the certain international regulations if they 
concluded special agreement with another party to the conflict, which is state. Michelle Mack 
explains that possibility conclude such agreement on obligations is provided under the common 
article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.281 One of the mentioned agreements was concluded 
between the Burundian government and the National Forces of Liberation,282 for example. As 
for the judicial practice, the courts take this kind of agreement into consideration during the 
proceedings. For example, in the Tadic case it was purposely stressed that Royalists as well as 
the President of the Republic in Yemen decided to abide the Geneva Regulations.283 Hence, it 
is possible to see that concluding agreement with armed non-state actors is also acceptable in 
order to prevent the use of human shields.  
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In addition, Michel N. Gross conducted the analysis on the obligations of such type of armed 
non-state actors as guerrillas and the analysis was in respect to the human shields. According 
to the research, guerrillas resorting to the use of human shields have 5 basic obligations. They 
are the using of human shields may take place when other means are not available, not resorting 
to imposing brutal penalties on members of the shield who do not wish to cooperate, ensuring 
that the quantity of human shields may result in disproportionate attack, refrain from the use of 
human shields if tactic is about to fail, and refraining from the use of human shields if there is 
an exaction that the shielding will not succeed.284 However, offering these obligations, Michel 
N. Gross did not explain how to make guerrillas obliged under these obligations, and the source 
of them also remains unclear. 
  
In general, it is possible see that armed non-state actors may be obliged by the norms of 
international humanitarian law. However, there is no perfectly working mechanism which 
could ensure that they are obliged regardless their will. It also remains unclear how to make the 
actors believe and follow customary law. Alternatively, it became clear that being obliged under 
the humanitarian law by the armed non-state actors mostly depends on their decision to 
cooperate and willingness to show the desire to have obligations and conduct hostiles 
considering the norms of international humanitarian law. Hence, the protection of the human 
shields in the context of the obligation of the armed non-state actors to not resort to the use of 
the shields remains a sharp a question. It is also not possible to conclude that prohibition to use 
human shields in non-international armed conflict is quite developed. As a result, it challenges 
the protection of human shields. 
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CONCLUSION 
  
To begin with, the conducted analysis made it clear that the concept of human shields has the 
features of originality but still overlaps with other concept under international law. Now it is 
clear that the concept of human shields and perfidy should be distinguished from each other, 
because they have different sense. It is understandable that occasion, when the combatants 
pretend civilian during combat, does not constitute human shielding. Additionally, it became 
clear that the concept of human shields has tight connections with the concept of direct 
participation in hostilities. Therefore, the development of human shields concept party depends 
on the development of the concept of direct participation in hostilities. Also, the human shields 
concept relates to the concept of principles of humanitarian law. The correlation is granted on 
the base that the principles provide human shields with protections. 
 
As for the status of human shields, the following should be noted. The status of involuntary 
human shields is always same to the status, which the members of the shield had before they 
formed the shield. In other words, civilians, who are forced to form the human shields, remain 
civilian having civilian status, and this applies to all categories of persons. Hence, the hors de 
combat, who formed involuntary human shields, remain hors de combat and they do not 
become active combatants engaged in combat. Also, it should be noted that since the 
involuntary human shields do not have an intent of assisting the belligerent, it is additional 
reason for the saving status.  
 
As for the United Nations peacekeepers in regard to the status of involuntary human shields, 
they are not an exception to the rule. It was established that the peacekeepers have double status. 
This double status does not influence the human shields status, however. Hence, when the 
peacekeepers originally had civilian status, then in time of shielding they remain civilians. As 
for the situation when the peacekeepers originally have combatant status, they will have the 
status of hors de combat in time of the shielding. The reason for that is the combatant status 
was changed to the hors de combat when the peacekeepers were taken as hostages. 
 
As for the voluntary human shields, the intent to help the belligerent and the conduct, which is 
widely accepted as direct participation in hostilities, make doubt whether the voluntary human 
shields may be classified as any persons who have a right to be actively engaged in hostilities. 
According to this study, the voluntary human shields may not be considered combatants in both  
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international and non-international armed conflicts. In international armed conflict they cannot 
be considered combatants because of the reason that they do not meet the requirements of 
combatant status.  
 
Along with the mentioned, the voluntary human shields are not authorized members of the 
armed forces, do not wear uniform, do not carry arms openly, do not have a fixed distinctive 
sign, and do not act in the light of laws and customs of war. As for the non-intentional armed, 
there is no legal term “combatant”. If to consider whether voluntary human shields meet the 
criteria of persons, who are regularly considered combatants, it is possible to see that human 
shields do meet the requirements. They are still not the members of regular armed forces, they 
do not carry arms openly, and they are engaged in combat temporary. In fact, voluntary human 
shields cannot be considered combatants.  
 
The voluntary human shields may not be considered the levée en masse having combatant 
status, even though the levée en masse basically are civilians engaged in combat. The reason 
for that is quite simple. The voluntary human shields do not meet the requirements of levée en 
masse. This is because of the reason that voluntary human shields do not carry arms and do not 
act as the laws and customs of war prescribe. Alternatively, the analysis has showed that 
voluntary human shields may not be considered as persons accompanying the armed forces. On 
one hand, both of them have a number of similarities. They dot carry arms openly and are side-
by-side with combatants. On another hand, in contrast to the persons accompanying the armed 
forces, the voluntary human shields do not have special identity card, which certifies that they 
are officially authorized to accompany.  
 
However, voluntary human shields perfectly meet the requirements of civilian status. First, they 
are not members of the armed forces which belong to the party to armed conflict. They are not 
authorized to take part in hostilities. Also, the shields do not have fixed distinctive recognizable 
at distance sign. The human shields do not carry arms and do not act in the light of the laws and 
customs of war. Additionally, when the voluntary human shields are engaged in combat and 
essentially act as the shields, they do not have the commander responsible for them as for the 
subordinates. In a line with having no responsible command, the voluntary human shields are 
not subject of internal system of discipline. They are formed spontaneously, without 
authorization, and there is no internal disciplinary system.  
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The direct participation in hostiles and the intent do not cause changes of and do not affect the 
status of voluntary human shields. Hence, civilian status of voluntary human shields remains 
civilian. In other words, civilians as human shields do not become combatants. There are 
already some proposals to make changes in respect to this status and make voluntary human 
shields be considered combatants. On one hand, it is a good proposal because it develops the 
concept of human shields in general. Alternatively, the brining of voluntary human shields to 
the combatant status will change the degree of and kind of responsibility, which the human 
shields have.  
 
On another hand, changes to the status enables changes to the provision on prohibition to use 
human shields. The rule prohibiting the use of human shields is customary rule and is prohibited 
method of warfare. When the human shield legitimately changes status to the combatant status, 
this says about the acceptance of the use of human shields as method of warfare. Such 
consequence is not acceptable not because of the reason that the 1949 Geneva Conventions will 
probably suffer changes. But because of the reason that such change will harm the basics of the 
protection prescribed to civilians. Also, one more reason, why human shields should not change 
status, is that human shields are not grey area in humanitarian law and the responsibility for the 
shielding already comes from their original status. 
 
As for the issue of human shields protection, the situation is the following. When it is the issue 
of protection, the division of human shields on voluntary and involuntary plays one of the 
essential roles. The thesis made it clear that involuntariness enables to exclude the influence of 
direct participation in hostiles on the protections prescribed to human shields. Therefore, the 
involuntary human shields have the full extent of protections, which are originally prescribed 
to civilians in general. Members of human shields as civilians are amount in full extent in the 
proportionality test, and the principle of proportionality is fully applicable to the involuntary 
human shields. Additionally, the principle of distinction should be applicable in full extent to 
the involuntary human shields since they are civilians without combatant status. Also, the taking 
of all kinds of precautionary measures is required in respect to the involuntary human shields. 
 
As for the protection of voluntary human shields, the thesis made it possible to establish that 
this issue is highly disputable. To begin with, there are several approaches to this question. One 
approach suggests that voluntary human shields should not be granted protections prescribed 
to civilian status, because of the reason that voluntary human shields take direct part in 
hostilities. Alternative approach is that voluntary human shields have intent, the kind of 
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participation does not matter, and there should be no protection granted. One more approach 
suggests that voluntary human shields may retain and may lose protections, but the retention 
and the loose depend on the kind of participation in hostilities. Therefore, when it is direct 
participation in hostilities, the shield loses its protections. Consequently, when it is not direct 
participation in hostilities, then the shield retains its civilian protection. In its turn, the last 
approach suggests that voluntary human shields should not lose protection. The argument is 
that voluntary human shields remain civilians. 
 
The protection of both types human shields does not preclude the liability. International 
humanitarian law does not allow the use of voluntary and involuntary human shields while 
international criminal law also prosecutes the use of voluntary and of involuntary human 
shields. The belligerent, which resorted to the use of human shields, may be prosecuted at the 
court. As for the members of human shields, the situation is not unambiguous. If the involuntary 
human shields have total protection from the prosecution for being member of the shield, and 
moreover, may seek justice for being used; the voluntary human shields may not be that 
careless. Voluntary human shields contradict the law, and therefore become responsible. Since 
the voluntary human shields are combatants, they do not bear the same responsibility as 
combatants do. However, the voluntary human shields may be responsible at domestic courts. 
 
As for the issue of developments, it became possible to conclude the following. The 
international legal regulation is enough developed in the context of the human shields status. 
Altogether, it was determined the status of human shields and established that human shield do 
not suffer the changes of status and do not lose the status at all when they take part in hostilities. 
Hence, it went clear that human shields retain the status and this rule is applicable to both types 
of human shields – voluntary and involuntary. In simple words, involuntary human shields 
always have status, which its members had had before they formed the shield. At the same time, 
voluntary human shields keep having the original civilian status. There is no place for 
development and changes in the context of human shields status. This is due to the fact the 
changes in status may result in the legitimizing the use of human shields and comprising the 
general protections of civilian population.  
 
Along with the developments, the international legal regulation of human shields has legal gaps 
too. One of the determined gaps is the official definition of human shields, which does not exist. 
The proposed alternative to the absence of definition can be the actual proposal of definition. 
Therefore, it is suggested to the definition of human shields to be as following. Human shields 
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are person or group of persons, who are civilians or another protected person, who voluntary or 
involuntary are utilized by belligerents in a certain area in order to achieve certain military 
objectives e.g. deter attack.  
 
Legal gaps were determined in the context of human shields protection. The application of 
proportionality principle is one of them. There is no common approach to the application and 
believes are divided. There is an opinion that the principle of proportionality should be 
applicable to and have no discount to voluntary human shields. The argument is that members 
of voluntary human shields are civilians having the right of life, being possibly manipulated to 
form the shields, and have the same protection as any other civilian. Another believe is that 
principle is not applicable to voluntary human shields, because they take direct part in 
hostilities. The alternative believe is that the principle is applicable, but relaxed. 
 
Possible solution to this issue is application of the regulations as it should be. In the view of the 
fact the voluntary human shields are civilians directly taking part in hostilities, it is logical and 
acceptable that they lose protections as it is defined by the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 
Geneva Regulations. Furthermore, this approach shows that there is no need for the 
developments and changes in the international legal regulation. This is because of the reason 
the legislation in force efficiently tackles with the issue of human shields protection and 
provides with the clear answer how the protection is supposed to be done. 
 
Another concern is the following. The armed non-state actors are not obliged under the 
international instruments, which preclude the use of human shields. However, there are several 
ways how to make them bear responsibility. The armed non-state actors should basically show 
the willingness to be obliged and to make a unilateral declaration or conclude an agreement 
with another party to the conflict. Alternative approach says that these actors may be obliges 
under the customary international law. However, in the non-international armed conflict the 
protection of human shields mostly depends on the decency and willingness of the party to 
armed conflict. The solution to this challenge is engagement of the armed non-state actors in 
the process of concluding agreement making them binding under the rules of international 
humanitarian law. 
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